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Polygamy After Windsor:
What's Religion Got to Do with It?
Casey E. Faucon*
Ever since the 1878 case, Reynolds v. United States, polygamists have argued that
their plural marriage practices are protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment. After Lawrence v. Texas, polygamists added substantive Due Pro-
cess arguments under the Fourteenth Amendment's "intimacy privacy" interpretation
to their arsenal. This article argues that in order for polygamists to find constitu-
tional protection and recognition, they must shed their arguments founded in relig-
ion and rely instead on substantive Due Process. Although First Amendment
jurisprudence would subject polygamy bans to a higher level of scrutiny, this height-
ened protection comes at a cost. The landmark same-sex marriage case, United
States v. Windsor, and the opinion's protected liberty interest of "equal dignity"
provides polygamy advocates with substantive grounds to protect their plural mar-
riage practices, as well as pave the way for recognition of "intimate pluralism " and
alternative relationship forms like polyamory and group marriage.
I. INTRODUCTION
The legal tide is beginning to shift in favor of polygamists in America.
On December 13, 2013, the Utah federal district court struck a prong of
Utah's criminal anti-polygamy statute as being unconstitutional in violation
of the polygamous family's First Amendment and substantive Due Process
rights.1 The family members at the heart of Brown v. Buhman are no stran-
gers to the controversial limelight. Kody Brown and his four "wives," Meri
Brown, Janelle Brown, Christine Brown, and Robyn Sullivan Brown, are
members of a religious fundamentalist offshoot of the Mormon Church who
practice polygamy as a tenet of their faith.' The Browns star in TLC's hit
reality television show, "Sister Wives," scheduled to air its sixth season in
September 2015.1 The intent of the show is to "explore[ I the daily issues
and realities of a plural family" and to "defend[ ] plural families and dis-
cuss[ ] the Browns' religious belief in polygamy."'4 Touting polygamy as the
* Casey E. Faucon is the 2013-2015 William H. Hastie Fellow at the University of Wis-
consin Law School. LL.M. (expected), University of Wisconsin Law School. J.D./D.C.L., LSU
Paul M. Hebert School of Law. B.A., Rice University. The author would like to thank Profes-
sor Tonya Brito for her direction, guidance, and valuable time; the University of Wisconsin
Law School's Institute for Legal Studies Workshop participants; the participants of the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin Law School's Junior Faculty Workshop; and Professors Mitra Shirafi, Adam
Lamparello, and Eric Berger for suggestions on earlier drafts and arguments.
'See Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1225-26 (D. Utah 2013) (striking down
the "religious cohabitation" prong of the Utah bigamy statute).2 
d. at 1178.
3 Azalea Pena, 'Sister Wives' season 6 cast news and updates: Meri divorces Kody be-
cause of Robyn, Robyn's reaction to critics, CHRISTIAN TODAY (Mar. 16, 2015), http://perma
.cc/74EU-X6VP.
' Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1178. The family members routinely participate in outreach
and education efforts to educate the public about their lifestyle. Even before the show aired,
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"next civil rights movement,"' polygamy advocates herald the case as a vic-
torious leap in their quest to legitimize the otherwise taboo marital practice
of up to 150,000 polygamists currently living as outlaws in the United
States.6'7
The Brown decision marks a sharp turn in the legal treatment of polyg-
amy since the 1878 U.S. Supreme Court case, Reynolds v. United States,
which upheld criminal sanctions against a Mormon polygamist over freedom
of religion objections.8 The federal district court in Brown held unconstitu-
tional a portion of Utah's criminal bigamy statute that criminalized "cohabi-
tation" between a married person and someone other than his or her spouse.9
Because religious polygamists can only legally marry one spouse, they en-
gage in de facto polygamy with subsequent wives, "marrying" them in re-
ligious ceremonies that have no legal effect or recognition. The court further
found that prosecutors have historically enforced this provision only when
such cohabitation was religiously motivated or when an underage girl was
involved.'0 Ultimately, the court held that exercising discriminatory enforce-
ment of the "cohabitation" provision against religious polygamists, as op-
posed to any other type of non-religiously motivated cohabitation, violated
both the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment protections."1 The de-
cision did not, however, nor did it attempt to, change the legal definition of
marriage, namely, the portion restricting civil marriage to one man and one
woman.'2 This holding simply had the effect of decriminalizing de facto po-
lygamy and did not, conversely, define a positive right that second, third,
and fourth wives should have their unions legally recognized.
This article argues that in order to redefine the legal definition of mar-
riage to allow spouses in multi-party relationships to allocate marital rights
to more spouses than one, polygamists should, as a policy, abandon their
arguments grounded in religious freedoms and, instead, look to the argu-
ments grounded in Equal Protection and substantive Due Process as defined
by the U.S. Supreme Court's recent landmark decision, United States v.
Christine Brown was interviewed by HBO in 2007, appeared in the TV show 48 Hours in
2008, and spoke at the University of Utah about polygamy and her practices in 2009. Brown v.
Hebert, 850 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1244 (D. Utah 2012).
'See Randy Hall, Polygamy Is 'Next Civil Rights Battle,' Activists Say, CNSNEWS.COM
(July 7, 2008), http://perma.cc/65RH-5Y2V.
6 See, e.g., Samuel D. Brunson, Taxing Polygamy, 91 WASH. U. L. REv. 113, 146 (2013)
(estimating up to 150,000); Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Some Muslims in U.S. Quietly Engage in
Polygamy, NATL PUB. RADIO (May 27, 2008), http://perma.cc/68U6-QMEV (estimating
50,000-100,000 Muslim polygamists alone).
'See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman & Joanna L. Grossman, Kody's Big Score in the Chal-
lenge to Polygamy Law, VERDICT (Dec. 24, 2013), http://perma.cc/9TBZ-GRK4; Jonathan S.
Tobin, Topic: Brown v. Buhman, 'Big Love' Vindicated: Polygamy and Privacy, COMMENTARY
(Dec. 15, 2013), https://perma.cc/H57R-GVZ3.
I See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161-68 (1876).
9 See Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1176 (D. Utah 2013).
Olld. at 1179.
'Id. at 1191-1226.21d. at 1195.
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Windsor.3 The Court struck down the federal Defense of Marriage Act's
definition limiting "marriage" to "one man and one woman," which ex-
cluded same-sex couples from receiving federal benefits reserved to married
heterosexual couples, as an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty.'4 The
Windsor decision found that the federal government's refusal to recognize
state-sanctioned same-sex marriages "demeans the couple."'" Justice Ken-
nedy's opinion further emphasized the favored status of marriage. In Wind-
sor's companion case, Hollingsworth v. Perry, the lower court recognized
that, in the United States, whether someone is married or not makes all the
difference.'6 Denying same-sex couples the same "equal dignity" as af-
forded heterosexual couples works an unequal protection of the laws and
impedes the liberty interest protected by the Fifth Amendment. Because the
Windsor court favored traditional, two-person marriage, some scholars argue
that the case that will change the fundamental nature of traditional dyadic
marriage will be the one after Windsor.17 The language and the approach in
Windsor, however, creates a theoretical and analytical bridge between the
liberty interests at stake for same-sex couples and for those who engage in
polygamy and other alternative forms of "intimate pluralism." The larger
political danger in failing to legally recognize and regulate polygamy is the
current and future impact that this would have on the value of diversity in
America, which is now expanding to include sexual orientation and alterna-
tive relationships structures, or "intimate pluralism," as part of that cultural
and social diversity.'
8
The need to recognize the autonomous choice of consenting adults to
structure their intimate associations in a manner best suited to the parties is
more than just theoretical. The practical effect of the failure to not only
decriminalize but also to legally recognize polygamy and other alternative
relationship forms leaves second, third, and fourth wives living in informal
polygamous marriages with none of the constellation of rights-or protec-
" United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
" See id. at 2695-96 (emphasis added).
is Id. at 2694.
16See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2010), affd sub
nom., Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and rem. sub nom., Hollings-
worth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (discussing intangible benefits of marriage and how
permitting same-sex marriage confirms the value of these relationships).
7 See William D. Araiza, After the Tiers: Windsor, Congressional Power to Enforce
Equal Protection, and the Challenge of Pointillist Constitutionalism, 94 B.U. L. REV. 367, 371
(2014) (arguing that Windsor confirms that future Equal Protection decisions considering
equality claims by emerging groups will likely turn less on application of suspect class doc-
trine and more on estimations of rationality); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. - (2015).
" See Ariela R. Dubler, Essay: Sexing Skinner: History and the Politics of the Right to
Marry, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1348, 1373-76 (2010) (discussing the larger policy of "intimate
pluralism"); Ariela R. Dubler, From McGlaughlin v. Florida to Lawrence v. Texas: Sexual
Freedom and the Road to Marriage, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1165, 1181 (2006) (characterizing
both McLaughlin and Lawrence as landmark cases for recognizing intimacy outside of
marriage).
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tions-afforded legal spouses.19 Many women see that criminalization only
compounds the downsides of their situations: one polygamous woman in
British Columbia, a mother of nine, testified that because of the polygamy
ban, she cannot see a marriage counselor; if she works outside the com-
pound, she has to lie about her status or she'll be fired. Another young wo-
man testified that she and her siblings have to lie to doctors, teachers, and
officials so that their parents will not be arrested. A third woman testified
that she has to spend money on lawyers and worry about child protection
services taking her children away. If polygamy were legal, she argued, she
could spend more time living her life openly without threat of prosecution.0
When second or third wives leave a polygamous marriage, they have no
rights to marital property or other benefits traditionally reserved for
"spouses," and courts fail to recognize their plight based on public policy
and uphold restrictions on their civil rights.2
Many argue that polygamy can improve upon the social conditions of
many religious women because it is both "pragmatic" and "identitarian."
The situations of many African-American Muslim women living in polyga-
mous marriages have gained national attention from the media. In 2008, Na-
tional Public Radio produced a two-part series on polygamous marriages in
Philadelphia,22 which has the highest density of polygamy, "due to a combi-
nation of conversions to Islam, currents of racial nationalism, and the demo-
graphic effects of male incarceration and underemployment.'23 NPR
interviewed first and second wives engaged in de facto polygamous mar-
riages. Many of these women saw the opportunity as a blessing. One wo-
man, whose name had been changed to "Mona," was divorced and
otherwise looked down upon in her Muslim community. Once she became a
second wife, however, she said that she felt the social stigma and weight of
being a single, divorced woman lift. 24 Another woman, called "Mecca,"
wanted to travel to the Middle East and study Arabic, which meant time
away from her husband. She had the idea to find her husband a second wife,
9 See JANET BENNION, POLYGAMY IN PRIMETIME: MEDIA, GENDER, AND POLITICS IN MOR-
MON FUNDAMENTALISM 6 (2012).
20 Id.
2! See, e.g., LA. CIv. CODE art. 88, 94, 96 (denying any civil rights to parties deemed
bigamous); Brownson v. Swensen, 500 F. 3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007) ("refusal to give
civil recognition to polygamous marriages."); Potter v. Murray City, 585 F. Supp. 1126 (D.
Utah 1984) (polygamy not constitutionally protected); In re Black, State in Interest of, 283
P.2d 887 (Utah 1955) (polygamous parents properly deprived of child custody); Patton v.
Cities of Philadelphia & New Orleans, 1 La. Ann. 98 (La. 1846) (children of polygamous
marriages do not inherit). Also, equity is used in some states to give "innocent" bigamous
spouses some interests in property that would have been community property had the marriage
been valid. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.73 (2007); LA. CIV. CODE art. 96 (2014); Medina
v. Medina, 131 P. 3d 696 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
22 Hagerty, supra note 6; Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Philly's Black Muslims Increasingly
Turn to Polygamy, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (May 28, 2008), http://perma.cc/ERR7-GST7.
23 Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for
Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1955, 1979 (2010).
24 See Hagerty, supra note 6.
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preferring the polygamous lifestyle because of the attendant freedom to
travel and ability to pursue her studies.
25
Even in strictly monogamous, majority non-Muslim countries and com-
munities, there have been calls for the legalization of polygamy. Caroline
Humphrey, who did a study of polygamy in Russia, found that both Russian
men and women think that the legalization of polygamy can resolve a social
deficit. Some women believe that "half a good man is better than none at
all," and that "legalization of polygamy would be a godsend: it would give
them rights to a man's financial and physical support, legitimacy of their
children, and rights to state benefits. '26 The dire social need is not the only
reason to recognize polygamous relationships. In 2012, news reverberated
throughout Brazil that a trio from Rio de Janeiro, a man and two women, had
formalized their union in order to protect their rights in case of separation or
death. Sao Paulo's public notary stated that the three should be entitled to
family rights: "We are only recognizing what has always existed. We are not
inventing anything. For better or worse, it doesn't matter, but what we con-
sidered a family before isn't necessarily what we would consider a family
today.'27 Recognizing a new, modem kind of family seems to be driving the
push in Brazil. For these and the many other social, cultural, and religious
reasons, over fifty countries throughout the world continue to recognize de
facto and legal polygamous marriages within their borders.
28
In the United States, where society and the law have historically sensa-
tionalized polygamy as being subversive and abusive toward women and
children,9 public sentiments are shifting in its favor. While most
polygamists continue to live in secret, the practice is slowly becoming more
visible and acceptable to mainstream society.30 After same-sex marriage, po-
lygamy has been heralded by some as the "next civil rights movement."'"
August 19th is National Polygamy Day, which in 2012 was held in Old
25 See Hagerty, supra note 22.
26 MARTHA BAILEY & AMY J. KAUFMAN, POLYGAMY IN THE MONOGAMOUS WORLD, MUL-
TICULTURAL CHALLENGES FOR WESTERN LAW AND POLICY 2 (2010).
27 Jessica Elgot, Brazil Approves Civil Union for Three People, Sparking Religious Fury,
THE HUFFINOTON POST (Aug. 29, 2012, updated Sept. 6, 2013), http://perma.cc/8B34-GL84.
28 For a detailed discussion of polygamy regulations in countries throughout the world, see
Casey E. Faucon, Marriage Outlaws: Regulating Polygamy in America, 22 DUKE J. GENDER L.
& POL'Y 1, 27-33 (2014). Of all Western counties, polygamy is legal in Australia, but only
where the union is performed based on religious or cultural reasons. See Elgot, supra note 27.
The U.K. permits polygamous unions if performed in countries where it is legal; the marriages
cannot be performed in the U.K. The U.K. also extends welfare benefits to the "spiritual
wives" and children of polygamists. Thomas Buck, Jr., From Big Love to the Big House:
Justifying Anti-Polygamy Laws in an Age of Expanding Rights, 26 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 939,
943 (2010); see also Baroness Flather, Polygamy, Welfare Benefits and an Insidious Silence,
DAILY MAIL (Sept. 16, 2011), http://perma.cc/H8EJ-EBJ8. See generally BAILEY & KAUFMAN,
supra note 26, at 7-68.
29 See Laura Elizabeth Brown, Regulating the Marrying Kind: The Constitutionality of
Regulation of Polygamy Under the Mann Act, 39 McGEORGE L. REV. 267, 268 (2008).
31 See BENNION, supra note 19, at 3; Maura Strassberg, The Crime of Polygamy, 12 TEMP.
POL. & Clv. RTS. L. REv. 353, 355 (2003).
3' See Hall, supra note 5.
2015]
Harvard Law & Policy Review
Orchard Beach, Maine and developed into a "widespread and religiously-
neutral" celebration.32 Public blogs and websites promote and discuss the
choice to live a polygamous lifestyle.13 In 2006, HBO premiered its first
episode of Big Love, a television show about the family and social life of a
fundamentalist Mormon polygamist and his three wives.34 The show ran for
five seasons on HBO and, in its fourth season, averaged over five million
viewers per episode.35 With the popularity of "reality" television shows,
TLC aired the first episode of Sister Wives on September 26, 2010, which
tracks the lives of the polygamous Brown family.36 After five years on the
air, the series is scheduled for a sixth season to begin in September 2015.
37
The Brown family parlayed their popularity to affect legal and political
change. The Brown case marks the first time in over 130 years that
polygamists have found some success in court. Since the very first case deal-
ing with polygamy in 1878, Reynolds v. United States, polygamists have
attempted to escape criminal prosecution based on arguments founded in
religious freedom, never with much success.38 When the Supreme Court de-
cided Lawrence v. Texas,39 however, polygamists found a new approach
founded in substantive Due Process. In Lawrence, the Court recognized for
the first time that intimate relationships outside of marriage are protected
liberty interests, at least with respect to homosexual sexual intimacy.40 Ad-
vocates for polygamy have tried to use that same reasoning to argue for the
decriminalization of polygamous behavior.4 1 Many scholars decry the com-
parison between same-sex relationships and polygamous relationships as too
attenuated in practice to support any colorable legal analogy.4 2 Polygamists,
such scholars argue, differ too much in structure, content, and influence of
32 See Pro-Polygamists Celebrate 12th Annual 'Polygamy Day', PRO-POLYGAMY.COM
(Aug. 19, 2012), http://perma.cc/93ML-JDJQ (detailing the events surrounding Polygamy
Day).33 See, e.g., BLACK POLYGAMY, http://perma.cc/E2VB-NQZD.
34 BENNION, supra note 19, at 3-4.
31 Stuart Levine, 'Big Love' Says Goodbye, VARIETY (Oct. 28, 2010), http://perma.cc/
MZD8-SSTF.
36 See Sister Wives (TLC television broadcast 2010-2015) (depicting the relationships be-
tween Kody Brown and his four wives, only one of whom has legal status as his wife).
31 Pena, supra note 3.
38 See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820
(Utah 2004); Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099 (10th Cir. 2007) (remanding case dealing
with three-person marriage); Potter v. Murray City, 585 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Utah 1984).
39 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
40 Id. at 578.
4' See, e.g., Michael G. Myers, Polygamist Eye for the Monogamist Guy: Homosexual
Sodomy. .. Gay Marriage . . . Is Polygamy Next?, 42 Hous. L. REV. 1451 (2006); Joseph
Bozzuti, The Constitutionality of Polygamy Prohibitions After Lawrence v. Texas: Is Scalia a
Punchline or a Prophet?, 43 CATH. LAW. 409 (2004); Cassiah M. Ward, INow Pronounce You
Husband and Wives: Lawrence v. Texas and the Practice of Polygamy in Modem America, 11
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 131 (2004); James Askew, The Slippery Slope: The Vitality of
Reynolds v. US After Romer and Lawrence, 12 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 627 (2006).
42 See generally Davis, supra note 23, at 1997; Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form
or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1615-18
(1997); Hema Chatlani, In Defense of Marriage: Why Same-Sex Marriage Will Not Lead Us
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their relationships from those in dyadic, same-sex relationships.43 Recogniz-
ing polygamous marriages would require wholesale change in the civil legal
marriage system, they argue, as thousands of federal, state, and private bene-
fits are structured around two-person marriage.44
Comparing the structure, content, and goals of polygamy with same-sex
marriage, however, skews the focus. Instead of focusing on the substantive
differences between monogamous marriage and polygamous marriage and
the administrative burden extension of marriage rights to polygamists would
entail, the focus should be on the similarities between the particular liberty
interests asserted. Since the inception of the idea that marriage is a funda-
mental right subject to equal protection of the laws,45 the Supreme Court has
moved away from determining access to certain rights based on defining
classes and more toward protecting the right, in its manifest forms, regard-
less of the class necessarily being excluded from enjoying that right.46 Until
the Supreme Court's 2013 decision in United States v. Windsor,47 it appeared
that the precedent established in Lawrence and its progeny cases did not
provide an encompassing enough right to extend to persons attempting to
change the structure of marriage to include more persons than one. After
Windsor, however, and Justice Kennedy's broad determination of the liberty
interest at stake-what this article terms "equal dignity" liberty-
polygamists find a much more supportable analogy to same-sex marriage
cases to promote their cause for both decriminalization and legalization of
polygamous marriage.
Although several intervening Supreme Court cases since the Reynolds
decision in 1878 falling under Equal Protection, substantive Due Process,
and freedom of religion have slowly reversed some of the more archaic iter-
ations on marriage and polygamy first set out in Reynolds,4s some of the
more engrained societal and legal restrictions on marriage remain. While the
Brown case represents a bold step toward decriminalization of informal po-
lygamous relationships, the decision does not go far enough-nor does it
attempt-to change the legal definition of marriage to include more than one
spouse.49 Even after Windsor, marriage-or access to marriage-remains an
exclusionary tool to use against unpopular groups. In the case of polygamy,
some same-sex marriage advocates are quick to shut the door in the face of
polygamists for fear of association with historical abuses and seemingly
archaic characterization linked to polygamy. In order to use Windsor as a
springboard for arguments to support the decriminalization and potential le-
Down a Slippery Slope Toward the Legalization of Polygamy, 6 APPALACHIAN J.L. 101,
128-32 (2006).
13 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 23, at 1989-95.
44 See, e.g., id.
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
46See Araiza, supra note 17, at 371.
47 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
48 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); see infra Part III.
" Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1194-95 (D. Utah 2013).
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galization of polygamy, polygamy advocates must shed their arguments
grounded in religion and rely instead on the substantive Due Process argu-
ments as delineated in Windsor. The Windsor decision recognizes the need to
mirror a state's choice to recognize a same-sex marriage with "equal dig-
nity" as a heterosexual one.50
The decision to do even that with respect to same-sex couples, let alone
polygamous relationships, is not without controversy. The history of civil
marriage fails to embrace the value of "marriage minorities" or "sexual mi-
norities" as positive attributes to society or adult relationships 1.5 Since the
inception of early American constitutional and philosophical development,
religion and law have been, theoretically, running on different (if not paral-
lel) tracks.52 With respect to marriage formation, however, this has not been
the case. Civil marriage laws are based heavily off of a Judeo-Christian,
Westernized version of monogamous marriage.53 Non-traditional marriage
customs are viewed as an attribute of "otherness" and distinctly "non-
American. '5 4 To normalize or Americanize these disparate groups, the mar-
riage laws act as bumpers, pushing these non-traditional marriage practices
toward the homogenous, monogamous American ideal of marriage.5 ,56 Thus,
American marriage and Free Exercise laws fail to represent the diversity of
culture and religion present within the country.
Polygamy represents just one type of an alternative marital relationship
in the larger quest for "intimate pluralism," which pushes against this tradi-
tional, restrictive view of marriage, in an attempt to give all marital-like
relationships "equal dignity" under the law. Even among practicing
polygamists in the United States, a diversity of cultural and religious motiva-
tions emerge.57 Fundamentalist Mormons are not the only players in the po-
51 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
51 Bigamy is a crime in 49 states and the District of Columbia. Massachusetts is the only
state that criminalizes polygamy and does not have a separate bigamy statute. See Claire A.
Smearman, Second Wives' Club: Mapping the Impact of Polygamy in U.S. Immigration Law,
27 BERKLEY J. INT'L L. 382, 429 & n.356 (2009).
52 See infra Part II.
5 See Cyra Akila Choudhury, Between Tradition and Progress: A Comparative Perspec-
tive on Polygamy in the United States and India, 83 U. COLO. L. REv. 963, 1002-03 (2012).
4 See id. at 1002.
55 See infra Part II; Antionette Sedillo Lopez, Evolving Indigenous Law: Navajo Mar-
riage-Cultural Traditions and Modern Challenges, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 283, 292
(2000); Sarah L. Eichenberger, When for Better is for Worse: Immigration Law's Gendered
Impact on Foreign Polygamous Marriage, 61 DUKE L.J. 1067, 1084 (2012); Rose-Marie Arm-
strong, Turning to Islam-African-American Conversion Stories, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY,
July 12, 2003 at 19-23, available at http://perma.cc/4XQD-3WPZ; see generally WILL KYM-
LICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 86 (Oxford
University Press, 1995).
56 This ideal affects immigration from countries that recognize polygamy. Compare 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10)(A), § 1229(b)(1)(B) (2006) (providing that the cancellation of removal
for inadmissible permanent residents requires a finding of good moral character), with 8
U.S.C. § 1101(f) (practicing polygamists might well be ineligible).
51 See BENNION, supra note 19, at 6; Irwin Altman, Husbands and Wives in Contemporary
Polygamy, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 389, 392 (2006).
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lygamy arena.58 Polygamists in the Islamic faith retain a large statistical
presence in the United States (and a larger presence worldwide) alongside
Mormon polyganists.59 And like Mormons of the nineteenth century, for
whom polygamy became just one manifestation of their rebellion against the
federal government and mainstream pronouncements on proper marriage be-
havior, many Muslims in the United States, particularly African-American
Muslims, embrace the practice as an indicator of their culture and differ-
ence.60 But unlike other types of alternative relationship structures, such as
polyamory, group marriages, friend marriages, or same-sex marriage,61 most
practicing polygamists still ground their justification in religion.62 American
polygamists are part of the seventy-eight percent of polygamists worldwide
that structure their marriage as "polygynous," with the husband as the head
of the household with their multiple wives and children.63 Mormon doctrine
characterizes this structure as a wheel, with the husband at the center and the
wives as different spokes, running through and connected by the husband at
the hub. 64
That attachment to religion, however, clouds the long-term picture. It
links three-person marriage to a much longer history and tradition, shrouded
in mistrust and public sensationalism of latent and patent abuses, preventing
58 Davis, supra note 23, at 1974-75. For a detailed discussion of the demographics of
practicing polygamists in the United States, see Casey E. Faucon, Marriage Outlaws: Regulat-
ing Polygamy in America, 22 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, 1-3 (2015).
5' Cf. Davis, supra note 23, at 1974 ("Philadelphia has the highest density of polygamy,
due to a combination of conversions to Islam, currents of racial nationalism, and the demo-
graphic effects of male incarceration and underemployment."); Maura Strassberg, The Crime
of Polygamy, 12 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 383, 405 (2003) ("If Mormon polygyny had
never developed in the United States, it seems likely that the issue of polygyny would only
have arisen in relation to the immigration of people from those African, Middle Eastern, Asian
and Southeast Asian cultures that practice polygyny."). Polygamy in the United States is not
limited to Utah, Mormons, or Muslims, however. Michele Alexandre, Lessons from Islamic
Polygamy: A Case for Expanding the American Concept of Surviving Spouse So As to Include
De Facto Polygamous Spouses, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1461, 1462 (2007); D. Marisa Black,
Beyond Child Bride Polygamy: Polyamory, Unique Familial Constructions, and the Law, 8
J.L. & FAM. STUD. 497, 498 (2006).
' Davis, supra note 23, at 1972.
61 Polyamory has been defined as "ethical nonmonogamy" or "engaging in loving, inti-
mate relationships with more than one person-based upon the knowledge and consent of
everyone involved." See Jessica Bennett, Polyamory: The Next Sexual Revolution, NEWSWEEK
(July 28, 2009), http://perma.cc/28VX-LF6Z.
62 Alexandre, supra note 59, at 1463; Adrian Katherine Wing, Polygamy from Southern
Africa to Black Britannia to Black America: Global Critical Race Feminism as Legal Reform
for the Twenty-first Century, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 811, 837 (2001); Black, supra note
59, at 500. But see Wing, supra, at 838 ("In many African countries ... the practice is based
on nationality or ethnicity, and not religion."); BAILEY & KAUFMAN, supra note 26, at 8 (list-
ing socio-cultural justifications for polygamy).
63 Davis, supra note 23, at 1966. As opposed to polygyny (one man with multiple wives),
some cultures continue to practice polyandry (one woman with multiple husbands). Id. Polyg-
amy is a gender-neutral term used to encompass both polygyny and polyandry. JANET BENN-
ION, WOMEN OF PRINCIPLE: FEMALE NETWORKING IN CONTEMPORARY MORMON POLYGAMY
138 (1998).
64 BENNION, supra note 63, at 138.
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polygamy from taking its place as the next step in the advancement of and
modernist move toward the deconstruction of traditional marriage in the
United States. Our exception for religious polygamy aside, over the past few
decades, the country has experienced a more "laissez faire attitude toward
family structure.'6 For many reasons, unmarried cohabitation continues to
rise.66 States are rapidly recognizing and performing marriages between
same-sex couples.67 With the breakdown of traditional, two-person marriage
emerges the potential for even more diverse adult relationship structures.
Polyamorous relationships, which encompass polygamy as a form of poly-
amory, are complex in content and can take a multitude of forms.6 The
polyamorous movement, which attempts to validate multi-party relationships
free from traditionally defined dyadic partner roles, is viewed as a modernist
movement,69 with some studies claiming as many as half a million people in
the United States openly living in relationships between multiple consenting
adults.70 The political impetus behind polygamy and its historical link toward
"backward" religious practices, however, keep polygamy from being in-
cluded in the discussions surrounding same-sex marriage, polyamory, and
group marriage, for example, despite sharing that common goal of respect-
ing consenting adult relationships that do not adhere to the traditional oppo-
site sex monogamous ideal. Modernist marriage advocates, in fact,
consciously separate themselves from religious polygamists because of the
historical distaste for the practice as "barbaric.
'71
The inability to separate polygamy from its religious ties prevents the
practice from inclusion in the modernist marriage movement. In order to
find social and legal recognition, polygamy proponents should divert their
arguments from religious freedoms and focus instead on the need for "inti-
65 BAILEY & KAUFMAN, supra note 26, at 3.
6 D'vera Cohen et al., Barely Half of U.S. Adults are Married-A Record Low, PEW
RESEARCH SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (Dec. 14. 2011), http://perma.cc/4N4S-XD53;
see also Aja Gabel, The Marriage Crisis: How Marriage has Changed in the Last Fifty Years
and Why it Continues to Decline, THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA MAGAZINE (Summer 2012),
http://perma.cc/Q9QQ-VKJP; Rose M. Kreider, Increase in Opposite-Sex Cohabitating
Couples from 2009 to 2010 in the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) to the
Current Population Survey (CPS), Housing and Household Economic Statistics Division
Working Paper.
67 Before the Supreme Court announced its decision in Obergefell v. Hodges on June 26,
2015, see 576 U.S. - (2015), which held that both substantive due process and equal protec-
tion under the Fourteenth Amendment require states to grant same-sex marriages and recog-
nize same-sex marriages validly performed in other states, thirty-seven states and the District
of Columbia recognized same-sex marriages after Windsor. See 37 States with Legal Gay Mar-
riage and 13 States with Same-Sex Marriage Bans, PROCON.ORG (Mar. 4, 2015), http://
perma.ccfrKE3-BSBW?type= source.
68 See Bennett, supra note 61.
69 See id. ("Today there are poly blogs and podcasts, local get-togethers, and an online
polyamory magazine called Loving More with 15,000 regular readers.") But Bennett also
notes that some polyamorists are not particularly interested in pressing a political agenda.
70 See id.




mate pluralism" based on "equal dignity" after Windsor. Further, although
including a freedom of religion basis for accommodating religious practices
may provide a higher level of scrutiny for religious polygamists, the after-
math of such a choice could elevate religious polygamy over non-religious
polygamy, such as that practiced for cultural, social, or necessity reasons, or
polyamory in other constitutionally impermissible ways. Although the
Brown court took much time to chronicle the historical persecution of relig-
ious polygamists in the United States, the Windsor case and its analysis of
Due Process and Equal Protection in the marriage context provide a wider
jumping-off point for polygamists and all other persons who seek to legalize
alternative marital arrangements, devoid of any freedom of religion claim.
Part II of this article introduces the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case
Reynolds v. United States and discusses the historical and social context in-
fluencing the Court's first foray into polygamy and the limits of the Free
Exercise Clause. This section will point out the lasting legacies that the
Reynolds decision had on civil marriage and polygamy. Part II takes each
such legacy in turn and contradicts or supports its continued validity today.
Part II concludes with a discussion of Reynolds' legacy on Free Exercise
doctrine, recognizing that despite the Court's expansion and contraction of
religious freedoms throughout its modem jurisprudence, polygamy always
remained an outlier.
Part III focuses on two interconnected concepts and their jurisprudential
bases that will influence any analysis of the constitutional recognition of
polygamy: the fundamental right to marriage and protected sexual intimacy.
This section will discuss the development of both doctrines and then discuss
how same-sex marriage advocates have used both lines to successfully chal-
lenge criminal and civil statutes outlawing same-sex activity and marriage.
Part III will then contribute to an ongoing debate about whether same-sex
marriage cases can be used to support recognition of polygamy, with legal
advocates and scholars coming down on both sides, ultimately concluding
that the argument is analogous enough to lend precedential support.
Part IV introduces the recent Utah federal district court Brown case,
marking a shift in the criminal treatment of religious polygamy since 1878.
This section discusses the legal arguments employed by the court in striking
down a portion of Utah's criminal ban against "religious cohabitation" as
unconstitutional. Part IV concludes with a discussion about the implications
of the Brown case on future polygamy litigation, pointing out that this case
did not challenge the civil restrictions against multiple simultaneous
spouses.
Part V introduces the concept of "intimate pluralism" and the same-sex
marriage case, United States v. Windsor. This section discusses the language
used by Justice Kennedy in Windsor, its legal aftermath, and its scholarly
criticisms, and briefly discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell
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v. Hodges,72 a consolidated same-sex marriage case that asked whether the
Fourteenth Amendment compels states to recognize same-sex marriages, and
the implications of that decision on polygamy. After analyzing the holding
in Windsor and its clarification and expansion in Obergefell, this Part re-
views the effect of the decision on state laws restricting same-sex marriages
and the different arguments employed by such lower courts following the
vague standard set out in Windsor.
Finally, Part VI discusses three critiques of Windsor, using those criti-
ques as an aid in predicting any arguments in support of polygamous mar-
riage under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and substantive
Due Process. Finally, Part VI discusses polygamists' stake from a First
Amendment standpoint, weighing the costs and benefits of adding a freedom
of religion challenge to the overall outcome. This section investigates what
adding a freedom of religion claim does for the potential legal success of the
claim and also how such an addition limits the ultimate goal of "intimacy
pluralism." This section concludes that, even with respect to polygamy and
despite its strong religious connotations, philosophical and precedential rea-
sons mandate that "intimacy pluralism," and not Free Exercise arguments,
should drive the analysis. Part VI concludes with an argument as to how this
approach to Windsor eradicates those lasting harmful effects of Reynolds on
marriage and polygamy in the United States and discusses the benefits of
striving for an ultimate goal of "intimate pluralism."
II. MARRIAGE AND POLYGAMY IN AMERICA AND THE LIMITS
OF THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
Any discussion of the potential legality of polygamy starts with Reyn-
olds v. United States, the seminal U.S. Supreme Court case that upheld the
constitutionality of criminal sanctions for polygamy.73 The Reynolds deci-
sion not only had the immediate effect of affirming the criminal conviction
of George Reynolds, but also entrenched into the legal and cultural rhetoric a
much larger legacy on both marriage policy in the United States and the
development of Free Exercise jurisprudence under the First Amendment.
74 It
would take over 130 years before the chilling effect of Reynolds on polyg-
amy in the United States would begin to thaw.75
A. The Reynolds Decision
In 1876, Congress enacted the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act ("the Morrill
Act"), which outlawed and criminalized polygamy in the federal territo-
72 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. - (2015).
7 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 145 (1878).
74 U.S. CoNsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion nor prohibiting the free exercise thereof').
71 See generally Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013).
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ries.76 In 1878, Brigham Young's secretary, George Reynolds,7 was charged
under the Morrill Act for marrying Amelia Jane Schofield while still married
to Mary Ann Tuddenham.78 The trial court instructed the jury to curtail the
spread of polygamy like one would an infectious disease, using protectionist
rhetoric and acting as a fear-monger would.79 In response, the jury convicted
Reynolds of bigamy,80 and the Utah Territorial Supreme Court affirmed.8
Reynolds appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court to make an exception to the
polygamy prohibition because of his genuine religious belief.8 2 The Court's
response as to his one religious-based defense became the standard by which
not only polygamous marriage was judged, but also all conduct attendant to
religious observance was measured.83 The Court acknowledged that the First
Amendment guarantees religious freedom, but that "religion" is nowhere
defined in the Constitution.8 4 In examining the scope of religious freedom in
the context of polygamous marriage, the Court proffered two arguments in
denying Reynolds' request.
In an oft-quoted passage from Chief Justice Waite's opinion,85 the Court
considered polygamy a distinctly non-Western cultural trait-"Polygamy
has always been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe,
and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively
a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people.8 6 This short statement
harkens to reliance upon "natural law" and differences between races to
76 "Bigamy" refers to the crime of entering into another legal marriage while one has a
living spouse. Buck, supra note 28, at 940-41. "Polygamy" refers to the practice of having
more than one spouse at a time. The Morrill Act failed largely because, in order to establish
bigamy, the government had to prove that a valid marriage ceremony took place while one
spouse was legally married to someone else. Morrill Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, 12 Stat. 501
(repealed 1910); see also SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MOP-MON QUESTION: POLYGAMY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 114-115 (2002). Most of
Utah's jurors and judges were Mormon, and the judicial system was unlikely to produce con-
victions for polygamy. Brown, supra note 29, at 274.
77 Todd M. Gillet, The Absolution of Reynolds: The Constitutionality of Religious Polyg-
amy, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 497, 511 (2000).
" Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145 (1878). The Morrill Act provided: "Every person having a
husband or wife living, who marries another, whether married or single, in a Territory, or other
place over which the United States have exclusive jurisdiction, is guilty of bigamy, and shall
be punished by a fine of not more than $500, and by imprisonment for a term of not more than
five years." Morrill Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, 12 Stat. 501 (repealed 1910).
" 98 U.S. at 145. The trial judge instructed the jury, "[Y]ou should consider what are to
be the consequences to the innocent victims of this delusion. As this contest goes on, they
multiply, and there are pure-minded women and there are innocent children .... [S]o do these
victims multiply and spread themselves over the land." Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 161-67.
13 See Gillett, supra note 77, at 512-13.
8 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878) ("Religious freedom is guaranteed
everywhere throughout the United States, so far as congressional interference is concerned.
The question to be determined is, whether the law now under consideration comes within this
prohibition.").
15 See, e.g., Choudhury, supra note 53, at 982; Gillet, supra note 77, at 513.
8 6Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
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justify disparate social and legal treatment.8 7 Professor Martha Ertman ar-
gues that, while it may have been acceptable for Eastern or African races to
engage in polygamy as in tune with their "barbaric" and "primitive" na-
tures, the public sentiment and resulting political determinates involved in
the case saw that Mormons-white Americans-were regressing by acting
in this fashion.88 She terms this behavior "race treason."89 The Court also
relied on its own Western legal tradition in looking to historical precedent.90
Despite polygamy's being one of the primary forms of marriage on a global
scale,91 the Court looked only to the treatment of polygamy in the English
court system-"[F]rom the earliest history of England polygamy has been
treated as an offense against society."92 The Court's "oddly incomplete ac-
count of political history" ignored the history of concubinage among royalty
and aristocracy in northern and western Europe.93
87 "Wedlock, or monogamic marriage ... is one of the elementary distinctions-historical
and actual-between European and Asiatic humanity .... It is one of the pre-existing condi-
tions of our existence as civilized white men, as much so as our being moral entities is a pre-
existing condition of the idea of law .... Strike it out, and you destroy our very being; and
when we say our, we mean our race-a race which has its great and broad destiny, a solemn
aim in the great career of civilization, with which no one of us has any right to trifle." Francis
Lieber, The Mormons: Shall Utah be Admitted into the Union?, 5 PUTNAM'S MONTHLY 225,
233-34 (1855) (emphasis in original).
88 See, e.g., Martha Ertman, Race Treason: The Untold Story of America's Ban on Polyg-
amy, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 287, 306-31. In Martha Ertman's work on race perception
and polygamy, she chronicles political cartoons of Mormon polygamists of the day; some
couched Mormon polygamists with "others"-Chinese immigrants, Native-Americans, Afri-
can-Americans, and Irish immigrants-as "troublesome." Id.
89 Congressional Republicans introduced a new basis to oppose polygamous marriages,
"race treason," comparing Mormon polygamy to "Chinese, Muslim, and South Asian 'des-
potic' cultural practices, like concubinage, coolieism, and prostitution." Ertman, supra note 88,
at 312-13. According to these characterizations, "civilization rose 'like the sun in the farthest
reaches of the East and advanced progressively westward,' leaving behind China, India, and
the Arab world as cultures 'past their glory."' Id. at 313 (quoting JOHN Kuo WEI TCHEN, NEW
YORK BEFORE CHINATOWN: ORIENTALISM AND THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN CULTURE 1776-
1882 xvi (1999)); see also Leti Volpp, Blaming Culture for Bad Behavior, 12 YALE J.L. &
HUM. 89, 96 n.39 (2000) ("China is changeless, the West progressive[;] the Chinese are pas-
sive, Westerners active[;] the Chinese are lemmings, Westerners individuals[;] the Chinese
state is despotic, the Western state democratic[;l the Chinese are irrational, Westerners ra-
tional[;] the Chinese are ruled by morality, Westerners by law") (quoting Teemu Ruskola,
Taking Chinese Law Seriously: Towards a Critical Theory of Comparative Law 52 (unpub-
lished manuscript)).
9 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164-65.
91 The ancient Chinese practiced polygamy, and the practice saw a resurgence in the dem-
ographic in the 1990s. See D.E. Greenfield, Marriage by Chinese Law and Custom in Hong
Kong, 7 INT'r & COMP. LQ. 437, 443-44 (1958). The Incas of Peru also practiced polygamy.
Carmen Rodriguez de Munoz & Elsa Roca de Salonen, Law and the Status of Women in Peru,
8 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 207, 208 (1976). The sultans of the Ottoman Empire also prac-
ticed polygamy. See Brooke D. Rodgers-Miller, Out of Jahiliyya: Historic and Modem Incar-
nations of Polygamy in the Islamic World, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 541, 551 (2005).
92 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164-65.
9 MARK E. BRANDON, STATES OF UNION: FAMILY AND CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL ORDER 206 (2013).
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The second justification, apart from notions of cultural propriety and
legal treatment, was that polygamy promotes the "patriarchal principle."94
Justice Waite's opinion reasoned that the "wheel" structure with the husband
at the center can "lead[ ] to the patriarchal principle, and which, when ap-
plied to larger communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism
.... 95 Despite critiques of monogamy as being just as patriarchal as polyg-
amy,9 6 the Court found the fear of the "patriarchal principle" a sufficient
reason to restrict religious exercise.97
Based upon these two justifications-proper racial and cultural behav-
ior and the dangers of patriarchy-the founding fathers did not intend the
"free exercise of religion" to encompass behavior such as polygamy.98 Even
though the practice was motivated by religious beliefs, the government was
able to limit the practice for the social good, to prevent a religious "rene-
gade" from becoming a "law unto himself," and to backstop against other
disdainful religious practices-such as human sacrifice or wife immola-
tion-that could result if polygamy were to open such a slippery slope.99 The
Court continues to view polygamy as so contrary to the public good that it
has become the primary example of why limits on Free Exercise are
justified."l°
91 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166. When Henry Maine addressed the issue of patriarchy in his
famous 1861 work Ancient Law, he "posit[ed] it as the genesis of all known societies, in
which fathers exercised unqualified dominion over their wives, children, and slaves." HENRY
SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 111, 118-19, 133 (3d Am. ed. 1888). Islam also views polyg-
amy as a husband-oriented institution, heavily entrenched in gender norms. BAILEY & KAUF-
MAN, supra note 26, at 8-9. In the Islamic tradition, a man can have up to four wives at a time,
as long as he treats them all justly and equally. Davis, supra note 42, at 1966. As opposed to
polygyny (one man with multiple wives), some cultures have and continued to practice polyan-
dry (one woman with multiple husbands). Id. at n.27.
95Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
96 Just one year after women in Utah were granted the vote, Susan B. Anthony and Eliza-
beth Cady Stanton went to Utah and spoke to the Mormon women there and discovered:
"Though the Mormon women, like all others, stoutly defend their own religion, yet they [are]
no more satisfied than any other sect." ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, EIGHTY YEARS AND MORE
284 (Source Book Press 1970) (1898). The American Woman's Suffrage Association did not
support polygamous women. To them, polygamy did nothing but undermine that equal bar-
gaining power of monogamy. When the Utah women's votes had failed to extinguish polyg-
amy by 1882, the NWSA no longer associated with Mormon polygamous women either.
Ertman, supra note 88, at 330.
97 Gillet, supra note 77, at 514.
98 It is also implicit that Professor Lieber's theories on polygamy were likely more a re-
flection of his overtly critical stance toward Mormonism in general. Id. at 514. Professor
Lieber had written other articles in which he characterized Mormon theology by 'vulgarity,'
'cheating,' 'jugglery,' 'knavery,' 'foulness,' and as bearing 'poisonous fruit."' Francis Lieber,
The Mormons: Shall Utah Be Admitted Into the Union?, 5 PUTNAM'S MONTHLY 225, 233
(1855).
99 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67.
10 See Buck, supra note 28, at 981-82.
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B. The Immediate Aftermath of Reynolds and its Lasting Legacies
Reynolds was a resounding defeat of polygamy in the nineteenth cen-
tury. Without a doubt, it was not until after the Reynolds decision that the
Mormon Church eventually renounced polygamy. Utah prohibited polygamy
forever in its state constitution in order to gain statehood.101 Subsequent
Mormon polygamy cases further solidified the federal government's defeat
of the practice, and Reynolds was used in later cases to justify much more
than criminal penalties for polygamy, such as restricting voting rights of
those who professed belief in polygamy or confiscating the property of the
Mormon Church valued over $50,000.10 Despite its age, Reynolds has never
been overruled and, although its practical effect was to legitimize criminal
sanctions against polygamy, its lasting effects on marriage policy in the
United States are much more profound. This subsection chronicles the im-
mediate aftermath of the decision and the continuing impact of Reynolds on
marriage policy today.
1. Turned Polygamists into Outlaws
While the majority of the Church complied with the Church's new
stance against polygamy, many followers created splinter fundamentalist
sects that continued to preach the divine nature of "celestial marriage,"103 or
polygamy.°n The criminality of their behavior, however, drove these groups
101 See Gillet, supra note 77, at 533.
103 In Davis v. Beason, the Court upheld the conviction of an Idaho man who was denied
the right to vote because of his affiliation with the Mormon Church. 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890).
The Court quickly dismissed the case, holding the statute constitutional, by repeating many of
the arguments made in Reynolds. The Court rejected the claim that polygamy was protected by
the free exercise of religion and argued instead that "[b]igamy and polygamy are crimes by
the laws of all civilized and Christian countries .... They tend to destroy the purity of the
marital relation, to disturb the peace of families, to degrade woman, and to debase man." Id. at
341. Davis was overturned in 1996 for restricting the right to vote based on religious beliefs.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). That same term, the Court decided [Mormon Church]
v. United States, upholding the constitutionality of the Edmunds-Tucker Act, which confis-
cated any real property of the Mormon Church valued over $50,000 and escheated such pro-
ceeds to the federal government. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
("Mormon Church") v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890). After characterizing the teachings of
polygamy as being odious and pernicious to an enlightened society, the Court chastised the
Church, thus justifying the government's taking of the Church's property. The dissolution of a
religious organization seems to clearly counter the doctrine of separation of church and state,
and the majority decision, in this instance, sparked a dissent signed by three justices. Mormon
Church, 136 U.S. at 66.
103 The term "celestial marriage" comes from a more general belief that man has the
ability to attain a state of godhood after death, whereas heaven is just an extension of a man's
life. The reverse could be true, and a state of godliness could be achieved on earth. The only
way to do this was to increase one's progeny on earth. Strassberg, Distinctions, supra note 42,
at 1579. Mormon fundamentalists, as a whole, dislike both "polygamy" and "polygyny" and
prefer the terms "the Work," "the Principle," or "Celestial Marriage." BENNION, supra note
19, at xvi.
104 The Primer: A Guidebook for Law Enforcement and Human Services Agencies Who
Offer Assistance to Fundamentalist Mormon Families, UTAH OmcE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN,'-
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underground, creating secretive communities which spread throughout the
West and Southwest,05 others fleeing as far as Mexico and Canada.'°6
Polygamists thus became renegades-marriage outlaws-cut off from main-
stream society and who, to this day, continue to grow in unregulated com-
munities, outside of the eyes of the law.
The fear of criminal prosecution for the act of polygamy alone has left
these religious outlaws outside of the protection that decriminalization and
legal recognition can provide. Outlawing polygamy leaves second, third, and
fourth wives with no legal rights or protections as only one wife, usually the
first one, can claim the legal status as a spouse. Many laws effectively ignore
the rights or situations of de facto second or third wives, refusing to grant
them "divorces" based on the absolutely null nature of their alleged "mar-
riages," or denying them any support or property entitlements. Even if the
husband treats them equally and fairly in private, these subsequent wives can
only reveal their married status in certain social circles, their relationships
being relegated to a place of silence and inferiority in public for fear of
social stigma or criminal sanctions107 Although the Court's purported intent
was to protect innocent women,0 8 it only exacerbated their tenuous legal
positions by pushing their lifestyles and existence into the shadows.
The continuing criminalization of polygamy, some argue, is the very
reason that the practice can perpetuate abuse. ' 9 One witness who had lived
in polygamy in Utah acknowledged that some fundamentalist Mormon
groups have unsavory practices, such as arranged marriages and teenage
brides."0 She believes, however, that if polygamy is decriminalized, polyga-
mous groups could be educated about incest, underage marriage, and sexual
assault."' Abuse could be dealt with more effectively than it is under the
current laws, where polygamists facing prosecution are sent into hiding."2
Some even argue that decriminalization, in addition to legal recognition and
regulation, would give the women and children involved even more rights.
Polygamy could be regulated in the same way as monogamy is, giving peo-
ple the right to be protected.' However, the impact that Reynolds had-
ERAL 8 (2011), http://www.familysupportcenter.org/Primer.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2014
[hereinafter "The Primer"] ("The fundamentalists adapted to a secret, underground lifestyle
to avoid prosecution and what they perceived as persecution from the 'world.')
105 Id.
'o Askew, supra note 41, at 631.
107 See Polygamists Share Their Faith and Family Lives, NAT'L PUB. RADIo (Aug. 19,
2011), http://perma.cc/46TS-Y5RL; Hagerty, supra note 6; Hagerty, supra note 22.
101 Reynolds v. United States, 87 U.S. 145, 165 (1878).
109 See BENNION, supra note 19, at 243-51.
" 0 Id. at 6.
I Id.; see also Faucon, supra note 28, at 25-27.
112 BENNION, supra note 19, at 6.
113 Id. at 195-258. Emily Duncan argues that polygamy, like prostitution and alcohol con-
sumption, is an area where public policy could reflect practicality, not morality, and allow for
more effective regulation. Emily J. Duncan, The Positive Effects of Legalizing Polygamy:
"Love is a Many Splendored Thing", 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 315, 332 (2008) ("The
illegality of these acts merely drove the practitioners underground, exacerbating the practices'
negative effects. Prohibition spawned bootleggers, speakeasies, the sale of poisonous alcohol,
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engraining the criminality of the practice-continues to push these commu-
nities underground, outside of the purview and reach of the normalizing in-
fluence of mainstream society.
2. Established Monogamy as the Marriage Form that Protects
Women and Children
The Reynolds Court also determined that monogamy, as opposed to po-
lygamy, was the best marriage structure to protect innocent women and chil-
dren who would otherwise be unable to escape from such "despotism." This
perception continues to thwart polygamy advocates to this day, and media
reports sensationalize instances of abuse of young girls in the polygamous
context."4 The argument that monogamy is the best marriage structure to
protect women and children, however, overlooks the statistical reality that
abuse is no more common in polygamous relationships than in others.
Criminalizing every practicing polygamist to prevent the abuses of some is
an over-broad restriction."' Even law enforcement agrees; one FBI agent
who dealt with polygamous communities said, "At least 99% of all
polygamists are peaceful, law-abiding people, no threat to anybody. It's un-
fortunate that they're stigmatized by a band of renegades.""
' 6
Abuse occurs in all types of relationships, monogamous ones included,
and across all different cultural landscapes."7 One recent anthropological
study of polygamous families found that Mormon polygamy is no more
likely to involve abuse than mainstream monogamy. " ' Professor Debra
Majeed, who interviewed over 400 African-American Muslims and over a
dozen involved in a polygamous marriage, found no evidence of physical or
sexual abuse of children within polygamous marriages in that community."9
and created a lawless liquor industry largely run by the mafia. In the case of prostitution, many
scholars believe the laws against the practice have only helped make life more difficult for
prostitutes because the laws exclude them from legal protection, encouraging predators to take
advantage of their 'powerlessness.'").
114 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 25, at 277; Janet Heimlich, No Refuge, TEXAS OBSERVER
(Aug. 1, 2012), http://perma.cc/8RQS-ND66; BENNION, supra note 19, at 2, 163-94.
"' Duncan, supra note 113, at 332.
116 Bella Stumbo, No Tidy Stereotype: Polygamists: Tale of Two Families L.A. TIMES (May
13, 1988), http://perma.cc/AWW2-HCGV.
17 See BENNION, supra note 63, at 154 (arguing that abuse in polygamous societies is a
result of individual personality types that would be abusive in monogamous culture as well);
Duncan, supra note 113, at 332; see also Eve D'Onofrio, Child Brides, Inegalitarianism, and
the Fundamentalist Polygamous Family in the United States, 19 ITr'L. J.L. POL'Y & FAM. 373,
374 (2005) (comparing the erosion of the traditional monogamous family model with the po-
lygamist family model); Strassberg, Distinctions, supra note 42, at 1578 ("[M]onogamous
marriage in America has been described as highly patriarchal, and nineteenth-century Mormon
views on the proper gender roles for women were not particularly unusual, or out-of-step with
their non-Mormon contemporaries."); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAM-
ILY 138 (1989) ("[G]ender-structured marriage involves women in a cycle of socially caused
and distinctly asymmetric vulnerability.").
"8 BENNION, supra note 63, at 154; see also Askew, supra note 41, at 648-49.
"' If it does occur, she states, it is exceedingly rare. Inside African-American Muslim
Polygamy, NATL PUB. RADIO (July 23, 2008), http://perma.cc/834Q-C8CB.
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Tim Dickson, a lawyer who argued that the anti-polygamy laws are uncon-
stitutional, suggested that the high instance of teen pregnancy in Bountiful,
B.C., may be linked to religion and isolation rather than to polygamy per se.
He referred to a U.S. study that suggested that evangelicals and members of
other highly religious groups tend to have higher rates of teen pregnancy
than the general population.120 Dickson indicated that other small religious
towns in the same region have extremely high teen birth rates (such as Ha-
zelton, where births to mothers under 20 account for 22 percent of all live
births).
In 2006, Janet Bennion published an article detailing the results of
study that she conducted on abuse within polygamous communities in the
Utah Valley.'2' Bennion concluded:
I found that 95 percent of the abuse cases occurred in a rural envi-
ronment. In the study, I describe six cases of arrests of perpetrators
from polygamous groups and examined the factors that contrib-
uted to the abuse. Three men were arrested for sexually abusing
their daughters, two were incarcerated for marrying child brides,
and one was arrested for beating his children. In all six cases, I
found the following conditions: a rural environment, frequent ab-
sence of the father from the home, lack of female network, isolated
locations with natural geographical barriers to escape, over-
crowded households, and the presence of "father worship," as de-
fined by Jankowiak. Combined with the adoration of the father
was a strict code that required the obedience of all children and
wives. The punishment for breaking this code was known as blood
atonement, a physical whipping or cutting of the skin to atone for
the sins against the father. In my view, correlation between abuse
and isolation is twofold: abusers deliberately choose remote places
in order to maintain control over their victims without being ob-
served; and women in such isolated locations are unable to leave
the community easily. I believe that this correlation offers strong
evidence against finding a necessary causal connection between
polygamy and abuse. Instead, it is my belief that forcing polyga-
mous families to the fringes of society facilitates instances of
abuse taking place outside the watchful eye of law enforcement.'22
Isolationism, in tandem with "frequent absence of the father from the
home, lack of female network, isolated locations with natural geographical
barriers to escape, overcrowded households, and the presence of 'father wor-
ship,"' 123 Bennion argues, perpetuates the abuse, and not the practice of po-
lygamy per se. In these types of conditions, men who are prone to abuse
120 BENNION, supra note 19, at 6.
121 Id.
1
22 Id. at 15-16.
123 Id.
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have the opportunity to flourish, regardless of whether they are the head of a
polygamous household or a monogamous one.
24
Many feel the laws against polygamy are antiquated and do not con-
sider the variability in polygamous lifestyles. Similarly, Professor Adrian
Nedrow points out that if polygamy were lawful, "some women would no
doubt make poor choices of plural mates, just as some women now make
poor choices of monogamous mates; that is no basis for eliminating the op-
portunity to make that choice."'25 By taking such a protectionist position,
polygamy bans thwart an available option for modem men and women look-
ing to navigate through life in an increasingly diversifying and complicated
society.'26 Many polygamous women maintain that they choose polygamy or
polyamorous relationships because it fills a personal and community void,
regardless of its religious connotations. Bennion, who lived with two funda-
mentalist Mormon groups known as the Harker Group and the Allred Group
for eighteen months, found that "polygamy ultimately improved the situa-
tion of a considerable number of women who had experienced extreme so-
cial, economic and/or emotion deprivation in the Mormon mainstream."'27
The women chose this lifestyle because it ensured that they had the opportu-
nity to marry and raise their children within a strong network of sister wives
and other women, all within the valuable context of religion.
Under these same arguments, some have posited that polygamy can im-
prove upon the social conditions of African-American Muslim women.
28
Although many African-American women likely tire of constantly being re-
minded about the lack of marriageable African-American men,129 polygamy
and polyamory can be a viable alternative, especially for devout Muslim
women who will not marry outside of their religion.30 Although Reynolds
established monogamy as the form that best protects women, time has
shown that modem women are capable of determining their own intimate
lifestyles.
3. Used Governmental Control over Civil Marriage as an
Exclusionary Tool Against Unpopular Political Groups
One of the more influential legacies of Reynolds was its explicit an-
nouncement on who controls the issue of marriage-the government, not
individuals-and what factors contribute to that determination. Historically,
124 Another study concluded that these abuses are the result of "particularly dysfunc-
tional" polygynist families rather than problems inherent to polygyny. Strassberg, Crime of
Polygamy, supra note 30, at 398.
125 Keith Nedrow, Polygamy and the Right to Marry: New Life for an Old Lifestyle, 11
MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 303, 337 (1981).
126 BENNION, supra note 19, at 8-9.
127 BENNION, supra note 63, at 154.
128 See Davis, supra note 23, at 1970-71; Wing, supra note 62, at 858.
129 See, e.g., Wing, supra note 62, at 858.
130 See Qur'an 2:22 1. Supposedly women, being the "weaker sex," may be forced to re-
nounce their religion due to pressure from their husbands. Wing, supra note 62, at 2900.
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before the advent of "civil marriage," persons united to form families either
through their mutual agreement or through family and community consent.131
If this concept were carried forth into today, it would allow persons to struc-
ture their marriages however they deemed desirable, with minimal interfer-
ence from the state-same-sex marriage, polygamy, and polyamory, to
name a few. Professor Elizabeth Brake argues that "marriage minimalism"
requires that states only impose a duty of care between/among spouses, leav-
ing the contours of the rest of the constellation of marriage rights up to the
individuals in the marriage.'32 Despite the quest for this minimalist ideal-
ism, 133 civil authorities continue to regulate marriage, if not to simply protect
against underage marriage and to ensure consent.34 The Reynolds decision
addresses this truggle head-on: to allow individuals to define for themselves
the contours of such an important feature of social life as marriage would be
to allow every man to "become a law unto himself."'33 This need for proce-
dural control, some argue, takes the guise of individual protection: "Like the
'protection' small businesses get from the mafia, implicit in the need for
protection is the threat to the state's control over the meaning of marriage, of
a social' as well as legal variety."'136 Similarly, restrictions on access to mar-
riage, as defined by the state, represent the state's ability to control an other-
wise intimate relationship between consenting adults.
The Reynolds opinion recognized the sacredness of the marital relation-
ship and the individual contractual nature of marriage, but then also grasped
upon the civic and social importance of marriage in support of governmental
control and oversight.37 Because of the elevated status and desirability of
civil marriage,3 s governmental actors have used access to marriage as a po-
'~' See generally JEAN BRISSAUD, A HISTORY OF FRENCH PRIVATE LAW 88 (1912).
132 Elizabeth Brake, Minimal Marriage: What Political Liberalism Implies for Marriage
Law, in Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy, in CHICAGO
JOURNALS Vol. 2 (Henry S. Richardson ed., 2010), http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/
651429, http://perma.cc/F7RR-EELJ.
133 Because such liberalism with respect to marriage could not exist in a society requiring
justice, as such marriages could be structured as asymmetrical, Brake argues that such
minimalism is merely an ideal. Id. (citing Steven Wall, "Perfectionism, Public Reason, and
Religious Accommodation," Social Theory and Practice 281-304 (2005) (on the conflict be-
tween public reason and perfectionism)).
134 Incest, along with polygamy and bestiality, is called the "trinity of deviant forms."
Although this article recognizes that consent, and the ability to consent, plays a large role in
shaping the reach of state control over marriage, incest introduces different social and public
policy reasons that separate it in different ways from polygamy and polyamory. See generally
James M. Donovan, Rock-Salting the Slippery Slope: Why Same-Sex Marriage is Not a Com-
mitment to Polygamous Marriage, 29 N. Ky. L. REV. 521, 521-90 (2002), http://perma.cc/
9UYF-BZSD; Kent Greenfield, The Slippery Slope to Polygamy and Incest, THE AMERICAN
PROSPECT (July 15, 2013), http://perma.cc/632E-WC7R; German Incest Couple Lose Euro-
pean Court Case, CNN.coM (Apr. 13, 2012), http://perma.cc/7HB9-BBGB.
"I Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878).
136 Katherine B. Silbaugh, The Practice of Marriage, 20 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 189, 215
(2005).
3 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164-65.
'3 See generally Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), affd
sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F. 3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) (as the Perry court understood, in
America, whether you are married makes all the difference).
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litical tool to gain power or suppress unpopular groups. Indeed, in the case
of Reynolds, the Mormon Church was considered threatening by the federal
government not only for their polygamous practices, but because the
Church's unfettered growth in the then-underdeveloped Utah Territory
threatened the federal government as its own "separatist theocracy."'39 After
their arrival in the "Mormon Corridor," the Mormons set up their own form
of secular government, called the State of Deseret, with its own constitution,
a General Assembly, a Governor, and a Supreme Court. Deseret even had its
own alphabet, the Deseret Alphabet, composed of thirty-six letters based on
phonetic sound. The Mormons developed their own militia, their own cur-
rency, and voted according to church politics.n° The Reynolds decision was
later used to restrict voting rights or jury services of those who professed a
belief in the practice.'
41
Even today, state and federal actors use their civil control over marriage
to suppress politically unpopular groups, and this process is nothing new.
Anti-miscegenation laws in effect during the Jim Crow era were part of the
broader attempt to disenfranchise and segregate blacks.142 The current debate
over same-sex marriage is more prominently than ever a political and civil
rights issue, with national influence and significance.43 Supporters for or
against marriage equality for gays separate across party lines, and access to
equal rights for gays has been called the "greatest civil rights question of our
generation."'144 In that same vein, polygamy advocates hail their struggle as
the "next civil rights movement."'145 As Reynolds perpetuates, controlling
access to marriage is a tool of the political majority, as traditional marriage
is still elevated above all other types of intimate relationships in the eyes of
the law and society and thus a status worth "protecting" from politically
139 See generally Ertman, Race Treason, supra note 88, at 298-99.
140 Id.
141 In Davis v. Beason, the Court upheld the conviction of an Idaho man who was denied
the right to vote because of his affiliation with the Mormon Church. 133 U.S. 333, 348 (1890).
The Court quickly dismissed of the case, holding the statute constitutional, by repeating many
of the arguments made in Reynolds. The Court rejected the claim that polygamy was protected
by the free exercise of religion and argued instead that "[b]igamy and polygamy are crimes by
the laws of all civilized and Christian countries .... They tend to destroy the purity of the
marital relation, to disturb the peace of families, to degrade woman, and to debase man." Id. at
341. Davis was overturned in 1996 for restricting the right to vote based on religious beliefs.
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
142 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 1 (1967) (overruling Virginia ban on interracial
marriages).
141 See Adam Lamparello, Why Justice Kennedy's Opinion in Windsor Shortchanged
Same-Sex Couples, 46 CONN. L. REv. ONLLNE 27, 32 (2014) (arguing that the Court's majority
opinion in Windsor threatened its institutional legitimacy by implying that Windsor was a
political, rather than constitutional, decision); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003).
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (finding that the inherent problem with Justice Kennedy's liberty-
driven analysis in Lawrence was that it increases the likelihood that presidential elections, not
the Constitution, will play the primary role in creating and expanding individual rights).
Adam Liptak, High court to rule on same-sex marriage across US, THE BOSTON
GLOBE (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2015/01l/16/supreme-court-
will-decide-gay-marriage-issue-this-term/EWmTyyDuqUfuRQ9m5Jn5bJ/story.html, http://per
ma.cc/83PV-WLF4.
115 See Hall, supra note 5.
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unpopular groups.46 More than ever, marriage equality issues are becoming
national and international focal points, and national policies on the issues
can play out on a world stage. Although the Morrill Act is no longer in
effect, 47 Reynolds still is, and its political and cultural implications gave
later courts a basis to deny and devalue "marriage diversity" in later sub-
stantive Due Process and Equal Protection marriage cases.
4. Nationalized Monogamy Based on Westernized, Christian
Notions of Morality
Apart from the immediate practical effects of outlawing polygamy,
often overlooked is the fact that the Morrill Act represents one of the few
times that Congress enacted a federal definition or limitation on marriage.
4
The choice of monogamy over polygamy, as argued in Reynolds, became the
prerogative of each controlling government to define, 49 despite being tradi-
tionally within the power of the states.5 0 With Reynolds, the "monogamous
family" became nationalized and federalized.5 ' The nationalization and fed-
eralization of monogamous marriage as the marital ideal in America so early
on in our development of concepts of inalienable and fundamental rights had
the effect of labeling any type of non-conforming marital arrangement here-
after as being "un-American."' 52 Restricting the analysis of acceptable mari-
tal behavior to the historical vacuum of Western civilization, indeed to
English common law and U.S. legal treatment, ignores the global influences
that shape marriage both inside and outside of the U.S.
This limited view of fundamental rights has a larger influence on soci-
ety's treatment of other non-conforming cultural and religious practices that
immigrants might continue to practice and thus establish in the United
States. Although American courts now attempt to respect religion and cul-
tural practices of its citizens without unnecessarily intermingling themselves
with issues of religious theory and practice, this "American secularism" is
'46See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164-65 (1878).
141 Morrill Act of 1862, 7 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.
148 See BRANDON, supra note 93, at 206.
'49 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167.
"' See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2680. For a discussion of the early tradition of the federal
family, see Kristin A. Collins, Federalism's Fallacy: The Early Tradition of Federal Family
Law and the Invention of States' Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1761 (2005).
'S This quest began much earlier with the attempt to assimilate the indigenous, who did
engage in informal, de facto polygamy. Government actors were more apt to recognize poten-
tially polygamous marriages between the indigenous and European settlers, however, as an
acceptable abeyance in furtherance of the larger goal of assimilation. Lopez, supra note 55, at
292.
152 This ideal affects immigration from countries that recognize polygamy. Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a)(10)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10)(A) (2006); INA
§ 204A(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1)(B) (providing that the cancellation of removal for
inadmissible permanent residents requires a finding of good moral character, for which prac-
ticing polygamists are per se ineligible under INA § 101(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)); see also Sarah
L. Eichenberger, When for Better is for Worse: Immigration Law's Gendered Impact on For-
eign Polygamous Marriage, 61 DuKE L.J. 1067, 1084 (2012).
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still based upon a Judeo-Christian and Western ideologies.'53 Under these
options, "American secularism" has been described as being distinctly "as-
similative"-"When in Rome, do as the Romans do."'154 Gary Jacobsohn
describes this secularism as an attempt "to create a national civil and politi-
cal identity with which all citizens and aspiring citizens must conform."'55
From these descriptions come two main themes: that Americans are free to
have a diversity of religious beliefs, but that these religious beliefs must be
subsumed under a normative, assimilative national identity that is distinctly
"American." It is this second tenet of American secularism that allows the
curtailment of total exercise of religious freedom, including polygamy.'56
This application finds no greater example than in the arena of family
law and marriage formation.' The earliest judicial decisions against polyg-
amy make express their disgust for the practice based on the good morals of
a "Christian" society.' Although the First Amendment developed out of a
fear of the political embrace of any one religion, Reynolds emerged during a
time when Protestant Christianity was unquestioned as the socially domi-
nant, majority religion. s9 It would take hundreds of years, numerous federal
challenges, and rebukes by the Supreme Court to chip away at the authority
of legislatures to use morality as a basis for disparate treatment and to sepa-
rate public culture from this Christian version of society, a battle still fought
' In a multi-ethnic country with a large immigrant population, religious and cultural
secularism can take one of four forms. MATHAIS ROHE, MUSLIM MINORITIES AND THE LAW IN
EUROPE: CHANCES AND CHALLENGES 16-17 (2007). The first model is "assimilation," in
which diverse immigrants give up their own cultural and religious identities and completely
adapt to the lifestyle of the majority. Id. The second model is a sort of intermingling in which
"differing cultures overlap resulting in a fundamental change to the previous cultural context
of the receiving population." Id. The third model is "segregation," where the local majority
and the immigrant minorities remain separated as much as possible, keeping their own cultural
identities and religious practices. Id. The fourth model is "acculturation," in which both the
local population and the immigrant population change and meld in culture and practices in a
process of "mutual communication." Id.
154 For an excellent discussion of theory of assimilation in the context of immigration into
the United Kingdom, see Meena Bhamra, On Cultural Diversity: The Importance of Normative
Foundations for Legal Responses, in LAW AND ETHNIC PLURALITY: Socio-LEGAL PERSPEC-
TIVES 9-30 (Prakash Shah ed. 2007). Kymlicka points out that while it is possible to leave
one's culture, such is "analogous to the choice to take a vow of perpetual poverty and enter a
religious order." KYMLICKA, supra note 55, at 86. Thus, asking someone to live without their
own culture is like "asking them to live an impoverished existence." Bhamra, supra note 154,
at 13.
115 Choudhury, supra note 53, at 969.
156 Hera Hashmi, Too Much to Bare? A Comparative Analysis of the Headscarf in France,
Turkey, and the United States, 10 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER, & CLASS 409, 433-37
(2010).
157 BAILEY & KAUFMAN, supra note 26, at 69-71; Rosemary R. Hicks, Religious Plural-
ism, Secularism, and Interfaith Endeavors, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO AMERICAN IS-
LAM 162-64 (2013).
' Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163 (1878).
... Cf Hicks, supra note 157, at 161-62 ("[S]ecularism in the United States has never
been neutral or antireligious but accommodates particular kinds of Protestant practices more
than, and sometimes to the exclusion of, Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, and other traditions (such




today.60 Consider the attention received when a holy book other than the
Bible was used at an official swearing in ceremony.'6' Despite these steps,
strong proponents of morals-based government action and the upholding of
"traditional" family values based on monogamy and Christianity persist and
find very public support in all three branches of the federal government.
5. Intertwined the Question of Marriage with Religion
By grounding the decision on the Christian morals of Western society,
the Court in Reynolds irreversibly intertwined the legal analysis of marriage
and polygamy with religion. It is important to remember that Reynolds was,
and remains, a First Amendment case. Although a Bill of Rights existed at
the time of the Reynolds decision, the concepts of substantive Due Process
and fundamental rights, especially the right to marry, had yet to crystallize in
the legal rhetoric. The Court recognized the sacredness of the "sacrament of
marriage," but the only substantive ground upon which Reynolds based his
appeal was under freedom of religion.162 Much of the Court's opinion pro-
vides the type of language and analysis which today would inform the right
to marry and intimacy privacy.163 But the Court used this type of analysis to
limit Free Exercise under the First Amendment, thus allowing marriage laws
to be informed and influenced by Judeo-Christian morality. This intermin-
gling, although slowly on the decline in terms of legitimate constitutional
analysis, still influences perceptions and laws on proper marriage structure
and behaviors today. Despite Free Exercise rights experiencing great expan-
sions and retractions according to the composition of the Court over the last
century, the religious practice of polygamy always remained as an outlier,
seemingly beyond question as a religious practice that states could restrict.64
In order to escape this lasting effect, courts must rid their analyses of polyg-
amy as a religious issue.
160 See Choudhury, supra note 53, at 968-71.
161 Thomas Jefferson's Qur'an, now part of the Library of Congress, was used in the
swearing-in ceremony of Keith Ellison, the first Muslim American elected to the U.S. Con-
gress in 2007. Virginia Congressman Virgil Goode stated that he feared many more Muslims
would come to the United States if immigration policies were not enforced to uphold "the
values and beliefs traditional to the United States of America." Zachary A. Goldfarb, Va
Lawmaker's Remarks on Muslims Criticized, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2006), http://perma.cc/
G7P7-EBQN. Ellison responded that his family had been in the United States since 1742: "I'm
not an immigrant... I'm an African-American." Rachel L. Swarns, Congressman Criticizes
Election of Muslim, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/21/us/
2 lkoran.html?_r=0, http://perma.cc/M2CE-SPSX.
162 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 160-66.
163 Id.
' Buck, supra note 28, at 978-83 (arguing that the Supreme Court views polygamy as so
contrary to the public welfare that its mere existence justifies limits on free exercise of
religion).
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III. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO MARRIAGE, AND EXPANDING
ON INTIMACY PRIVACY
The law and scholarship on marriage policy in America has expanded
from the archaic policies that informed the Reynolds decision. The Supreme
Court in Reynolds recognized the sacred nature of marriage and, over time,
developed a line of jurisprudence encompassing sexual intimacy as part of
an individual's privacy interests. Although rights to marriage and private
sexual intimacy differ, they are not mutually exclusive, but have deep over-
lap as individual privacy, sexual intimacy, and marriage are all definitive
degrees on the same spectrum of rights. This section will briefly discuss the
fundamental right to marriage and equal protection after Loving v. Virginia
and Zablocki v. Redhail, then discuss the development of privacy intimacy
after Lawrence v. Texas. Same-sex rights advocates rely upon these cases to
support marriage equality. Although many scholars want to expand the ratio-
nales in these cases to include polygamous marriage, others decry the exten-
sion as improper and ill fitting. 65 This section addresses that debate and
ultimately concludes that the reasoning pre-Windsor as gleaned from those
cases fall short of supporting an analogy. However, the language used to
define the liberty interest at stake in Windsor does support an application to
polygamy now.
A. Finding a Fundamental Right to Marriage
Scholars point out that, although the Constitution says little about the
family, "assumptions about the forms and functions of families were in the
background."'' 66 Even before Loving v. Virginia and Zablocki v. Redhail, the
Supreme Court characterized marriage as "the most important relation in
life"'167 and "the foundation of the family and of society, without which there
would be neither civilization nor progress."'16 8 In 1923, in Meyer v. Ne-
braska, the Court held that the freedom to marry was a constitutional right
guaranteed by the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause.16 9 Thus,
65 Id. at 990-91.
166 BRANDON, supra note 93, at 263.
167 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
1681d. at 211.
169 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) ("While this Court has not attempted to
define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration
and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage
in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience,
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."). Two years later, the Court reaffirmed this right
under both the First and Fourteenth Amendments in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
536 (1925), and later in 1942 with Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 537 (1942)




the right to marry was wrapped up in the larger liberty interest at stake in the
Bill of Rights, protected as fundamental under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses.70 But it was not until the 1960s that the Court began to
crystallize the contours of the liberty interest in the right to marry and then
expand the reach of its protection.17" ' In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court
struck down a state law that banned married couples from obtaining contra-
ceptives.172 The Griswold case marked the first time that the Court tied mar-
riage to the right to privacy, a right "older than the Bill of Rights ... ." The
Court extended the constitutional privacy protection, a much more devel-
oped concept in the Supreme Court's legal rhetoric, to marriage and empha-
sized that couples who had attained the status of "married" were granted
certain rights.73 Thus, the Court recognized that married couples had a pri-
vacy component at stake in their liberty interests, thus expanding upon the
rights attendant to that status.
Although the Court did not specifically hold that there was a fundamen-
tal right to marry, this language found its way into the constitutional juris-
prudence two years later in the famous 1967 case of Loving v. Virginia. 74 In
Loving, the Court held that Virginia's ban on interracial marriage violated the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
7
Although the decision is most known for its Equal Protection analysis in
terms of prohibiting interracial marriage, the Court conducted an additional,
and equally controlling, analysis under the Due Process Clause:
The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men. Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamen-
tal to our very existence and survival. To deny this fundamental
freedom on so unsupportable a basis as [ ] racial classifications
... so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart
of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's
citizens of liberty without due process of law.
76
170 Nedrow, supra note 125, at 305.
171 Id.
172 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
173 Nedrow, supra note 125, at 323.
174 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
175 The Court determined that the right to marry was a fundamental one, but never fully
explained the constitutional basis for such finding. The general consensus is that either the
Fourteenth Amendment's personal liberty right or its orderly pursuit of happiness right guaran-
tees the fundamental right to marry. See id. at 12; see also Nedrow, supra note 125, at 324.
176 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. One commentator argues that based on Loving and Griswold
alone, religious polygamists should find constitutional protection: "If Griswold were to be
stretched to its furthest extent, the decision would permit polygamous relations within licensed
marriages. If a citizen chose to live with one woman while married to another, the state would
not have the right to interfere with the relationships without sending "police to search the
sacred precincts of the marital bedrooms." A First Amendment challenge to laws outlawing
polygamy might combine the right to exercise one's religion freely and the right to privacy
within marriage espoused in Griswold." Gillet, supra note 77, at 515.
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Thus, using Loving and later marriage cases,177 what began to emerge was
the concept that the right to marry is fundamental and, based on Griswold,
that married couples enjoy a right to privacy within that marriage sphere.
It was not until Zablocki v. Redhail, however, that the Court distinctly
recognized the fundamental right to marry-"The right to marry is of funda-
mental importance for all individuals."'78 The decision also marks the first
time that the Court held that direct restrictions on the right to marry would
receive "strict scrutiny." Professor Adrien Nedrow, writing in 1981 in favor
of polygamous marriage recognition, opinioned that although Loving and
Zablocki provide that restrictions on the fundamental right to marry receive
strict scrutiny, no case had yet to define how polygamous lifestyles might be
protected, if at all.' 79 This, however, is not accurate. Loving was, foremost, a
decision rooted in Equal Protection. The Court specifically held that mar-
riage cannot be denied to anyone on the basis of race. The Court also found
that the purpose of the law was to discriminate, and thus, animus alone could
not support the strictest possible scrutiny. So although the substance of the
right to marry, and all of what that entails, had nebulous boundaries in the
constitutional rhetoric, the Equal Protection Clause was used to protect that
interest when denied to suspect classes. The substance of the right to marry
and what it encompasses, however, becomes more important over time be-
cause, as scholars point out,80 the Court's abandonment of any salient Equal
Protection analysis in recent gay rights cases leaves the lower courts clinging
to the substantive Due Process analysis taken from these cases and the ex-
tension of the "liberty" interest to ground their decisions.
B. The End of Morals-Based Legislation
The Loving decision ignited another small departure from Reynolds-
the use of public morality and sheer animus to justify unequal treatment.'8'
The Court's famous 2003 case, Lawrence v. Texas, solidified that shift away
from morality, at least in theory.82 In Lawrence, the Court declared Texas
laws criminalizing gay sodomy unconstitutional. 3 The Lawrence decision
overruled a previous decision by the Court, Bowers v. Hardwick, which up-
held the criminalization of both homosexual and heterosexual sodomy.8 4 In
Lawrence, the Court reasoned: "[T]he fact that the governing majority in a
State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a suffi-
117 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
17 8 Id. at 374.
179 Nedrow, supra note 125, at 328-29.
lSO See Eric Berger, Lawrence's Stealth Constitutionalism and Same-Sex Marriage Litiga-
tion, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 778 (2013); Lamparello, supra note 143, at 30;
Araiza, supra note 17, at 385.
""1 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (white supremacy insufficient reason to
support bans on interracial marriage).
182 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
113 Id. at 578.
"s See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986).
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cient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice."'85 Lawrence
shows the Court moving away from traditional notions of marital make-up
as a basis for the States' criminalizing homosexual activity.8 6
Not only did the majority opinion read a much more expanded view of
the Constitution than its plain language would suggest in order to move
away from the traditional vision of morality and relationships, but it also
recognized the force that the popular majority has in America: "The issue is
whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views
on the whole society through operation of the criminal law."'87 The Court
found that its "obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate its
own moral code."'88 As such, both the Court and constitutional commenta-
tors found Lawrence to herald the death of legislation restricting liberties
solely based on a majoritarian perception of morality. The holding and lan-
guage of Lawrence also do much in overruling the negative implications of
Reynolds on marriage and alternative lifestyles in the constitutional
jurisprudence.
Much has been written of Justice Scalia's dissent from the decision,
naming him either a "punchline" or a "prophet" in the marriage and moral-
ity arena.89 Justice Scalia's dissent argued that he Lawrence decision left all
morals-based legislation subject o judicial attack. With respect to this "slip-
pery slope" argument, Scalia continued: "State laws against bigamy . . .
[are] called into question by today's decision; the Court makes no effort to
cabin the scope of its decision to exclude them from its holding."' Thus,
Justice Scalia's slippery slope argument has been invoked to continue using
moral judgment in order to protect against harms society perceives as even
more immoral than homosexual sexual behavior. This approach plays a large
role in the current debate over using same-sex marriage cases to support
expanded protection for polygamists.
C. Expanding the Due Process Clause
The Court stated in Lawrence that the Due Process Clause endows peo-
ple with the constitutional right to define for themselves their "own concept
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life."'' Under this concept of autonomy, the Lawrence decision expanded
185 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
186 "Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or
the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they
might have been more specific. They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times
can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary
and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every genera-
tion can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom." Id. at 578-79.
18 7 Id. at 571.
188 Id. at 559 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
18 9 See Bozzuti, supra note 41.
19 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
191 Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 851).
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upon the scope of Due Process to include sexual conduct beyond the marital
relationship, allowing the individual, married or single, to be free from un-
warranted governmental intrusions. Thus, the government may not intrude
into sexual freedom and autonomy "absent injury to a person or abuse of an
institution the law protects."'92 Many polygamy advocates use the nebulous
prose, such as the now-infamous "mystery of life" rationale, as support for
polygamists to define their own concept of existence.
Another effect of Lawrence was that the Court subjected the Due Pro-
cess Clause to not just the confines of Western and Christian history, but
opened the analysis up to more international interpretations. Some scholars
have argued that Lawrence expands the Due Process Clause by "sug-
gest[ing] that the meaning of the Clause may be heavily influenced by the
legal traditions of other nations."'93 The Court cited the European Court of
Human Rights to refute the claim in Bowers v. Hardwick that laws regulat-
ing homosexual sex are universal.194 It also cited a brief submitted by Mary
Robinson, who served as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, for the
proposition that "[o]ther nations, too, have taken action consistent with an
affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in inti-
mate, consensual conduct."'95 Although this approach has been criticized by
some legal scholars as improper use of foreign law,'96 this approach em-
braces a more multi-cultural, global understanding of human rights removed
from the confines of Western morality and tradition. Related to the concept
of international interpretations was Lawrence's mandate that the moral code
of the majority cannot dictate the private practices of the minority.
97
D. Using Lawrence in the Polygamy Debate
Since Lawrence, polygamy proponents have seized upon its expanded
conception of fundamental liberty and privacy rights to argue that polyga-
192 Id. at 567.
1 What is Needed to Defend the Bipartisan Defense of Marriage Act of 1996? Hearing
before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, Sept. 4, 2003, available at http://perma.cc/4KD6-FB4R (statement of Richard G.
Wilkins, Professor of Law, Brigham Young University).
114 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 560.
195 Id. at 576.
196 See Buck, supra note 28, at 984. But see RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 69
(1992) ("Polygamy, in the form of polygyny, or plural wives ... is so common in non-Western
societies that it can fairly be regarded as the norm.").
197 Some retort that even removing "Christian" morality from the analysis and looking
strictly to the history of Western legal tradition, monogamy was the marriage culture during
the height of the Roman Empire, even before the advent of Christianity in the West. Buck,
supra note 28, at 986. Even earlier, Plato emphasized the need for dyadic marriage as a way
for humans to "draw[ ] the two halves of [their] original nature back together and tr[y] to
make one out of two and to heal the wound in human nature," recognizing monogamy as
"foundational to any republic." PLATO, SYM'oslum 191d 24 (Christopher Gill trans., Penguin
Books 1999) (c. 385-380 B.C.E.); see also PLATO, LAWS 6.773b, in THE COLLECTED DIA-
LOGUES OF PLATO 1350 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Lane Cooper et al. trans.,
Princeton Univ. Press 1989) (c. 355-347 B.C.E.).
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mous behavior should also be decriminalized.'98 Because the language of
Lawrence focused on private sexual activity of consenting adults, instead of
on Equal Protection based on discrimination against homosexuals as a class,
some argue that Lawrence's broad brush stroke as to what expanded liberty
means in this sexual privacy arena could also include the private relation-
ships of consenting polygamous adults.'99 Just because the majority may dis-
parage the practice, they argue, liberty requires that polygamists be allowed
to engage in their private sexual and intimate lives without fear of prosecu-
tion or stigma. This analogy is not without controversy. Many scholars, in-
cluding proponents of equal rights for same-sex couples, in fact oppose the
argument that the legalization of same-sex marriage will lead to the legaliza-
tion of polygamy. Much has been written on this issue2°° and, instead of
rehashing that extensive body of argument, I offer a few additional thoughts
on the analogy, ultimately finding that the "right" as defined by Lawrence
would not support an application to polygamous families.
The fact that the Court did not perform any "class" analysis in Law-
rence was better for polygamists because the structural and substantive dif-
ferences between same-sex and polygamous relationships are rife. Despite
the potentially similar liberty interests, one scholar argues that the analogy
fails because polygamy and same-sex marriage are different in content and
structure. Same-sex marriage is still "traditional," two-person marriage,
whereas polygamy contemplates more than two, affecting all current laws
based off of a two-person marriage model.20 Another argument is that po-
lygamy, unlike same-sex marriage, has multiple entrances and exits, and op-
posed to one beginning and an end by either death or divorce. A substantive
distinction often made is that marriage is a reflection of a person's desire to
be legally connected to the person/sex to whom they are sexually and per-
sonally attracted. Thus, same-sex marriage stems out of one's natural sexual
orientation, while polygamy does not implicate an alternative and unchange-
able sexual orientation. This distinction is a distinction without meaning,
however, as sexual preference is not the only motivation driving marriage.
People marry for a multitude of reasons, sexual attraction only being one of
them, or for some, not at all. Further, polygamists and polyamorists are also
sexually attracted, in differing degrees, to their partners.
From a legal and political standpoint, same-sex marriage proponents,
for the most part, distance themselves as far as possible from the polygamy
debate. The reason for this, however, is unnecessarily reactionary. As Justice
Scalia's opinion in Lawrence indicates, same-sex marriage opponents use the
"slippery slope" argument in an attempt to deny homosexuals legal rights:
recognizing same-sex marriages could lead to the repeal of laws against
'98 Gillet, supra note 77, at 530-31; Shayna M. Sigman, Everything Lawyers Know About
Polygamy Is Wrong, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101, 102 (2006). But see Strassberg,
Crime of Polygamy, supra note 30, at 363-67.
199 See, e.g., supra note 41.
2o See supra notes 41, 42.
20 Davis, supra note 23, at 1990.
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"bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adul-
tery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity.' '202 In response, same-sex mar-
riage advocates try to distance themselves and their lifestyles from
polygamy and other alternative marriage forms, instead of addressing the
incredulity of such a slippery slope argument at its face. Of course, same-sex
marriage will not lead to bestiality or pedophilia-a child cannot consent; an
animal cannot consent. Where the "consent" distinction runs into contact
with the "public policy" role of regulation concerns incest. In a recent case
from Germany, the European High Court affirmed the conviction of a Ger-
man man charged with incest after marrying and having four children with
his biological sister.2°3 Other public policies might mandate some restrictions
on marriages between consenting close relatives. States differ on this issue
already: some allow marriage between first cousins, while the general trend
is to limit it to between second cousins. Incest implicates a different set of
policy issues. However, adults should be able to allocate to their siblings
certain rights generally given to spouses, such as the ability to make health
care decisions or be named conservator or trustee of a spouse's property.
Similarities exist, however, between the legal and cultural treatment of
polygamy and same-sex marriage. Historically, both criminal and civil laws
imposed restrictions on both homosexuality and polygamy.24 Although the
political impetus and the religious nature behind polygamy differentiate it
from homosexuals and same-sex marriage, as a group, again their paths are
parallel. The law criminalized their "deviate sexual intercourse.'205 Both
groups are forced to live in the proverbial "closet" for fear of criminal pros-
ecution and social stigma. With polygamists, as a group their legal treatment
has pushed them to live in secretive communities or to hide their polyga-
mous identities from mainstream society.206 Further, many of the social mis-
perceptions and negative stereotypes which were used to discriminate
against gays have also been used against polygamists: that they are
pedophiles, sexually deviant, and abusive and immoral.07 Opponents to both
groups use such unfounded rhetoric to justify unequal treatment.
Public perceptions of both activities have slowly changed the larger
public perceptions about homosexual behavior and polygamy stemming
from those pernicious personifications. Badly handled police raids and dubi-
ous governmental activity, illuminated by the media, have aided in the turn-
202 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
203 CNN Wire Staff, German Incest Couple Lose European Court Case, CNN.coM (Apr.
13, 2012), http://perma.cc/8UZU-XKT5.
204 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558 (invalidating Texas statute criminalizing homosexual
sodomy); Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1170 (D. Utah 2013) (invalidating Utah
statute criminalizing "religious cohabitation").
205 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563.
204 See supra Part H.




ing of public sentiments toward community acceptance.20 8 Isn't this
community acceptance part of the liberty interest at stake for both same-sex
marriage and polygamists?2°9 Although differences exist between polygamy
and same-sex marriage, the history of legal and public perceptions of both
practices run parallel, and in that regard increased public and media expo-
sure has benefitted both groups.
The Lawrence Court, however, did not give subsequent cases the op-
portunity to make those distinctions and comparisons for purposes of defin-
ing a class. The language used was, instead, grounded in this concept of
liberty wrapped up in substantive Due Process. Scholars critique the prosaic
nature of Justice Kennedy's opinions in both Lawrence and later Windsor as
not providing a textual basis to support recognizing rights for homosexuals
as a protected class.2 10 It is hard to say, then, what the decision even really
meant for homosexuals, much less for future constitutional analysis and ap-
plication to polygamists. Unless scholars use Justice Kennedy's broadly de-
fined liberty interest in a results-oriented manner, as some scholars say that
Kennedy, himself, admits to doing,2 ' judicial restraint would mandate that
the liberty interest protection in Lawrence cannot then extend to polygamous
relationships. The liberty interest was still confined to intimate relationships
based on a two-person model. The liberty interest, however, as later ex-
panded upon in Windsor, does open the door to an application of the right to
same-sex marriage to a right to polygamous marriages.
IV. A WIN FOR THE "SISTER WIVES": BROWN V. BUHMAN
The judicial prudence of using Lawrence to support rights for polyga-
mous families is again ripe for discussion. On September 26, 2010, a reality
TV show called "Sister Wives" starring a polygamous family living in Utah,
headed by Kody Brown and his wives Meri Brown, Janelle Brown, Christine
Brown, and later Robyn Sullivan Brown, aired on TLC. 212 Some believed
that the Browns would be opening themselves up to criminal prosecution
because in Utah, as with all other states in the U.S., polygamy is a crime.
213
Kody claimed that he was breaking no laws because he was only legally
married to one of his wives-in this case, Meri. 214 However, Utah's bigamy
statute allows a court to find a polygamous marriage based upon informal
cohabitation akin to common-law marriage, which requires no legal registra-
208 See, e.g., Photos from a Notorious 1953 Raid on a Polygamist Arizona Town, LIFE
MAGAZINE, available at http://perma.cc/5P88-WMJF; Gary Kamiya, 1961 police raid pivotal
for gay rights in S.F., SFGATE.COM (Jun. 21, 2013), http://perma.cc/53JQ-SEPC.209 See infra Part VI.
211 See Lamparello, supra note 143, at 30; Berger, supra note 178, at 789-806.
2' See Lamparello, supra note 143, at 33-34.
212 See Sister Wives (TLC television broadcast 2010) (depicting the relationships between
Kody Brown and his four wives, only one of whom has legal status as his wife).
213 Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1178-79 (D. Utah 2013).
214 Id.
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tion for its recognition: "A person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing he has
a husband or wife or knowing the other person has a husband or wife, the
person purports to marry another person or cohabits with another person."2 '
Thus, under Utah's bigamy statute, a married person who merely cohabits
with another person is guilty of bigamy.
Despite the risks, the Browns proceeded with the show. Findings of fact
indicate that state officials acknowledged that the show triggered an investi-
gation of the family." 6 The Browns, in turn, sought a declaratory summary
judgment that the Utah Anti-Bigamy statute was unconstitutional."7 The
Utah District Court, in a 91-page Memorandum Decision, granted the
Browns' motion for summary judgment providing an introduction chroni-
cling the historical persecution and racialized perceptions of polygamy in the
United States.218 What the opinion reveals is a court astutely aware of the
magnitude of its decision, keen to hedge its bets, and eager to address the
merits of the constitutional challenges. The following subsections present
and analyze the court's reasoning under the Fourteenth and First
Amendments.
A. Substantive Due Process Under the Fourteenth Amendment:
Heightened Scrutiny
The first step in the court's analysis was to determine whether or not
restrictions on polygamy would receive heightened scrutiny under substan-
tive Due Process. Under the substantive Due Process implicit in the Four-
teenth Amendment, the government cannot infringe on certain fundamental
liberty interests unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a com-
pelling state interest."9 This type of heightened scrutiny only applies when
"fundamental rights" are at issue under Due Process. To establish the exis-
tence of a fundamental right, the right must be "deeply rooted in this Na-
tion's history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"
with a "careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.
20
The court took the second prong first-what exactly is the liberty inter-
est at stake? Is it the right to marry more than one person at a time? Or is it
more nuanced than that: the right to live with different persons at the same
time in a sexual relationship without fear of prosecution? The court made a
significant distinction at this point in the opinion between what it terms "po-
215 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101(1) (West 1997) (emphasis added).
216 Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1179.
27 The complaint alleged seven constitutional claims: Due Process, Equal Protection, Free
Speech, Free Association, Free Exercise, the establishment of religion, and a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant vio-
lated the statute by denying rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1176.218 1d. at 1180-90.
21 91d, at 1196-97.
220 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
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lygamy" and "religious cohabitation.'22 The former involves the attempt to
legally marry or purport to marry one spouse while still married to another;
the latter being the right at issue in the present case-occurring when
"Itlhose who choose to live together without getting married enter into a
personal relationship that resembles marriage in its intimacy but claims no
legal sanction.' 222 But then the court held that such "religious cohabitation"
failed to qualify as a fundamental right or fundamental liberty interest that
would trigger heightened scrutiny.
The court contemplated using Lawrence in order to employ strict scru-
tiny, as advanced by the Browns through their attorney, constitutional
scholar Jonathan Turley, but ultimately rejected this approach.223 The court
acknowledged that "no one disputes a right to be free from government in-
terference in matters of consensual sexual privacy,"224 but ultimately re-
jected the Browns' claim that a fundamental right to engage in private
consensual sexual conduct existed. Thus, the court rejected the use of strict
scrutiny to the Browns' substantive Due Process claim.
B. Free Exercise Grounds: Strict Scrutiny
Moving on from the substantive Due Process claim, the court then ad-
dressed the plaintiff's Free Exercise claim. Ultimately on this issue, the court
held that the Anti-Bigamy Statute was not operationally neutral because of
its targeted effect on specifically "religious cohabitation." The statute thus
failed under a strict scrutiny application of the Free Exercise Clause. A stat-
ute that is general in name but specifically targeted at a religious group for
purposes of enforcement or prosecution must meet a strict scrutiny standard,
and the government must identify a compelling interest to survive constitu-
tional muster.225 The court chronicled the history of the anti-polygamy legis-
lation in the United States, much in the same vein as previous scholars, who
point out the blatantly religious and political motivations behind the ban on
polygamy.
226
The court looked first to "polygamy" and concluded that Reynolds still
controls the analysis of "straightforward polygamy or bigamy in which there
is a claim to multiple simultaneous legal marriages.'227 As a generally appli-
cable law, the ban against simultaneous legal marriages was not required to
pass muster under strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. Although not
the locus of the court's decision, its use of Reynolds as precedent in this
context is questionable. The defendant in Reynolds did not attempt two legal
221 Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1197-98.
222 Id. at 1197.
223
1 d. at 1190.
224 Id. at 1223-25.
225 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32
(1993).
226 Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1180-90.
227 Id. at 1203.
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marriages at once, but rather was convicted of engaging in the same conduct
as "religious cohabitation" at question in the Brown case. As such, the
Brown case does not hold that Lawrence overruled Reynolds. What the court
more particularly meant to hold was that the neutral anti-polygamy civil
laws remain unaffected, but that the criminal laws banning informal polyg-
amy, just as in Reynolds, are unconstitutional.
With respect to the "religious cohabitation" prong of the prohibition,
the court did apply a strict level of review. The court found that although the
cohabitation prong of the statute was facially neutral, it was not operation-
ally neutral and was targeted as applied specifically at religious cohabitation
or religious plural unions.22 1 Only religious cohabitation was prohibited;
"virtually any other cohabitation is 'unpunished."'2 2 9 Mere cohabitation,
adultery, and fornication prosecutions are rare, occurring next to never, and
that adultery in which one person is married to another but lives with his or
her mistress or lover is not prosecuted under the bigamy or other statutes.
230
The opinion is apt to point out that the State itself indicates that it does not
prosecute those engaged in polygamy under the criminal statutes unless the
person has entered into a religious union with a girl under eighteen.2 3' The
court took great pains to detail from the record the religious motivations
behind the types of polygamy that may incite prosecution.
232
Because of the operationally biased application of "religious cohabita-
tion" prosecutions, the court found that any curtailment of the religious
practice must be narrowly tailored to support a compelling government in-
terest.2 3 In proceeding with this analysis, the court had to first identify the
compelling state interest: the state's interest in regulating marriage, based
upon laws premised on monogamy (the Tenth Circuit in Potter found this to
be a compelling interest).23 4 The ambiguity created by the cohabitation prohi-
bition alone, however, demonstrated sufficiently to the court that the statute
was not narrowly tailored to support monogamy.235 Religious cohabitation,
the court opined, cannot "plausibly be said to threaten marriage as a social
or legal institution. 236 Criminal sanctions are unnecessary to further the
state's interest in that regard. The state failed to adequately explain "how the
institution of marriage is abused or state support for monogamy threatened
simply by an individual's choice to participate in a religious ritual with more
than one person outside the confines of legal marriage. 237 The court went so
far as to point out the irony in the defendant's position, as the statute penal-
izes people for making a "firm marriage-like commitment to each other,
228 Id. at 1209-10.
229 Id. at 1210.
230 id. at 1210-15.231 Id. at 1211.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 1203.
2 34 Id. at 1217-18.
235 Id.




even though they know that their religious cohabitation does not result in
state-sanctioned or recognized marriages.'238 As the Browns pointed out, the
state's position "would suggest that Kody Brown would have avoided any
criminal exposure if he had simply maintained relations with multiple wo-
men, had children by them, but never expressed a belief in being spiritually
bonded to them.
239
The court continued: "Encouraging adulterous cohabitation over relig-
ious cohabitation that resembles marriage in all but State recognition seems
counterproductive to the goal of strengthening or protecting the institution of
marriage. '240 Thus, although the court accepted the government's compelling
interest of protecting monogamous marriage, prohibiting "religious cohabi-
tation" was an over-broad restriction. 4' Because of the failure of the statute
to adhere to the mandates of strict scrutiny under Free Exercise jurispru-
dence, the court struck down the cohabitation prong of Utah's anti-polygamy
statute. The court noted that with the cohabitation prong stricken, religious
polygamists will have "less of a need to be underground and the State can
more directly prosecute the independent crimes that are sometimes alleged
to be rampant in those communities.
242
C. Hybrid Rights Grounds
The court did not stop there, continuing through its analysis in order to
cover all potential grounds for challenge and to ensure that the cohabitation
prong would not stand on any basis. The court used the hybrid rights analy-
sis set out in Employment Division v. Smith, where a Free Exercise claim
coupled with a "colorable showing" of infringement of another recognized
and constitutional right will subject the restriction to heightened scrutiny.
243
Without much analysis, the court found that each of the Browns' "compan-
ion constitutional claims-the Freedom of Association claim, the Substan-
tive Due Process Claim, the Equal Protection Claim, the Free Speech Claim,
or the Establishment Clause claim, . . .- makes a 'colorable showing' of a




241 Another interest posited by the state but dismissed by the court was the prevention of
fraud and the misuse of government benefits. Without claiming legal status to marriage, the
court reasoned, "[I]t is difficult to understand how those in polygamous relationships who are
ineligible to receive legal sanction are committing welfare abuse when they seek benefits
available to unmarried persons." Id. at 1224-25. The third "compelling interest" presented to
the court focused on protecting vulnerable women and children from exploitation and abuse.
The court noted that the state presented no evidence of a causal relationship between the act of
polygamy and the offenses of "incest, sexual assault, statutory rape, and failure to pay child
support." Id. at 1220. The court was unaware of any instance where the state was forced to
bring a bigamy claim in place of the more egregious enumerated charges. Id. at 1220 n.64.
242 Id.
243 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
244 Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1222.
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the court struck down the cohabitation prong using the hybrid rights ap-
proach, in addition to finding no compelling interest. It is unfortunate, how-
ever, that the district court did not spend more time analyzing the hybrid
rights theory, as it provides the strictest form of scrutiny and presents the
strongest legal claim to decriminalize religious polygamy.
245
D. Due Process Grounds
The final analysis performed by the court returned to the substantive
Due Process rights asserted by the Browns. Noting that the "narrowest
ground upon which this court can find for the plaintiff is under the Due
Process Clause.2 46 The court provided that, although strict scrutiny was un-
available for the fundamental rights question, the cohabitation prong of the
statute was still unconstitutional under a mere rational basis review, relying
on Lawrence to support that point. Finding the "consensual sexual privacy"
of the Brown family members to be the "touchstone of rational basis review
analysis in this case, as in Lawrence," the court noted that while the protec-
tion of the monogamous legal family would be a legitimate governmental
interest (indeed, it is still considered a compelling one), the court held that
no rational basis exists for the state to limit religious cohabitation in further-
ance of that end.2 47 It then struck down the cohabitation prong as a violation
of Due Process under Lawrence.
E. Holding and Larger Implications
The court's decision, as it now stands, struck down the cohabitation
prong of the Utah anti-polygamy statute, although the remainder of the stat-
ute survives to prohibit and criminalize attempts to perfect two simultaneous
legal marriages. The court's use of Lawrence solidifies the parallels between
homosexual intimacy cases and plural union cases in the legal rhetoric, and
represents a great leap forward for polygamy advocates in pushing them-
selves more into the realm of a protected class/activity. Although the imme-
diate effect is to decriminalize "religious cohabitation," the type of non-
legal "marital" relationship as between Kody Brown and his second, third,
and fourth "wives," the decision does not go far enough to protect the rights
of subsequent wives, to decriminalize attempts to perfect more than one si-
multaneous marriage, or to change the legal definition of civil marriage to
include non-monogamous and alternative marital relationships.
In terms of the use of precedent, the Brown court's use of Lawrence to
apply to "privacy intimacy" in polygamous relationships is profound. Al-
though polygamy advocates have, since the Lawrence decision, argued that
245 For a discussion of the hybrid rights theory, see infra Part VIA.
246 Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1222.
247 Id. at 1222-25.
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its holding supports the decriminalization of polygamy,2 48 no court has used
Lawrence and applied it to polygamy until now. The decision at least solidi-
fies that the comparison between same-sex marriage and polygamy is valid.
By accepting the Browns' argument and basing its holding on the idea that
the cohabitation prong fails a rational basis test under Lawrence, the Brown
court has forced the Tenth Circuit to do an analysis of the parallel, accepting
or rejecting it once and for all.
249
Although the opinion does much to protect the religious liberty interests
at stake in polygamy, it does little to address the civil ramifications. Granted,
the court could only address the facts and arguments before it, but the more
groundbreaking case would be one in which the parties attempt to register or
officially add another spouse to their marriage.250 The Browns were fully
open about the fact that, for 20 years, Kody was only legally married to his
first wife, Meri. News reports are now surfacing that Kody and Meri di-
vorced in 2014, and that Kody discreetly married his fourth wife, Robyn
Sullivan Brown, last fall.25' Although he still calls his other wives as such, he
never purported or tried to be legally married to more than one at a time.
252
The court says that that type of behavior is acceptable and not subject to
criminal prosecution. What this holding does is decriminalize polygamy, but
then encourage those who practice to continue doing so unregulated and
outside of the protection of the law, leaving the non-legal spouse prone to
emotional jealously mandated by the inability to legally recognize more
wives than one. The decision only makes an accommodation for and encour-
ages the lack of any legal recognition, regulation, or protection for those
subsequent wives, perpetuating the inequality, social discrimination, and
lower status experienced by subsequent wives.
If such "religious cohabitation" is allowed, should the law legally rec-
ognize his second, third, and fourth wives? In the case of the Brown family,
consider the financial harms alone to the high-earner subsequent spouse, Ja-
nelle, who has multiple children by Kody and who makes large financial
contributions to the family,253 but who would have no rights to any marital or
community property for those contributions. Although the first wife's home-
maker and managerial skills are extremely valuable in such a large plural
family, many would find it unfair that she would be granted support and
property entitlements if Kody were to divorce or die, whereas Janelle, Chris-
tine, and Robyn would have none of the constellations of rights that flow to
Meri. Although all four spouses likely bring in financial revenue from their
248 See supra note 198.
249Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1170, appeal docketed, No. 14-4117 (10th Cir. Sept. 25,
2014).
250 See generally Bronson v. Swenson, 500 F.3d 1099, 1103 (10th Cir. 2007) (plaintiffs
sought multiple marriage licenses because they "subscribed to the religious doctrine of plural
marriages").
251 See Pena, supra note 3.
252 Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1178.
253 'Sister Wives' news: What is Janelle Brown doing for work?, EXAMINER.COM (Jan. 26,
2014), http://perma.cc/2DS4-9TAF.
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TV show and appearances, subsequent wives in less notorious polygamous
families who do not capitalize on their lifestyle in such a way may feel-and
indeed are-slighted by the law, leaving the decision open to potential Equal
Protection claims by such second, third, and fourth wives. The Brown deci-
sion does nothing to eradicate, but instead perpetuates, that inequality.
The last critique of the decision is that the parties and the court made
very obvious that its reasoning did not attempt to change or even challenge
the prohibition against simultaneous legal marriages, thus reinforcing the
state's adherence to a monogamous ideal. In fact, the court accepted without
much critique previous decisions by the Tenth Circuit holding that promot-
ing and protecting "monogamous marriage" was a compelling state interest.
Again, the case that truly challenges the systematic and legal reliance on
dyadic monogamy will be one that attempts to change the legal definition of
marriage to include more spouses than one.254 Such an attempt will herald a
fundamental shift in adult intimate relationships in furtherance of putting
alternative marital arrangements, including polygamy and polyamory, on the
same legal and social playing field as two-person marriage.
V. MARRIAGE DIVERSITY AFTER WINDSOR
Where the Brown decision so tactfully fears to tread, the recent block-
buster U.S. Supreme Court case United States v. Windsor could be used to
support arguments for the legal recognition of polygamous marriages.2 15 The
language of the opinion provides a particularly expansive framework to in-
sert polygamous relationships into the majority's privacy basis for striking
down the federal definition in the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"),
which defined marriage as being between one man and one woman.2 5 6 This
section will briefly discuss the Windsor decision, its holding and immediate
aftermath, and will then analyze three scholarly critiques of the decision and
how the aftermath of Windsor can be used to support arguments for polyga-
mous marriage. In fact, the case for constitutional recognition of religious
polygamy is even stronger than homosexual marriage because of the added
element of the First Amendment implications.
254 See, e.g., Bronson, 500 F. 3d at 109 (plaintiffs attempted to apply for multiple marriage
licenses based on their belief in plural marriage).
255 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2707 (2013).
256 Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") provided: "In determining the
meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word 'marriage' means only a
legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse'
refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." I U.S.C. § 7 (2012),
invalidated by Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). This definition, restricting marriage between




A. The Language of Windsor
In 1963, Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer began a long term relationship
after meeting in New York City.25 7 In 1993, the women registered as domes-
tic partners as soon as New York made that option available for same-sex
couples.258 In 2007, in light of Spyer's failing health, they traveled to Onta-
rio, Canada, where they were married.259 They returned to New York City,
which deemed their marriage valid, where Spyer later died in 2009.260 Spyer
left her entire estate to Windsor, her spouse, who then filed for the federal
tax exemption in inheritance taxes as Spyer's surviving spouse after paying
$363,053 in estate taxes.2 61 The Internal Revenue Service denied the refund,
claiming that Windsor was not a "surviving spouse" under DOMA's defini-
tion of the term.
2 62
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy delivered the major-
ity opinion. Although the first half of the opinion was dedicated to the
Court's finding of jurisdiction under Article III's requirement of a "case or
controversy,"'263 the profoundness of the Court's decision is its ultimate hold-
ing that DOMA's definition of marriage as applied by the federal govern-
ment to state-sanctioned same-sex marriages was an unconstitutional
deprivation of liberty under the Fifth Amendment and violated Equal Protec-
tion and Due Process.2 4 The Court arrived at this finding based on two
precepts: federalism concepts and Equal Protection/Due Process analysis.
On the basis of federalism concepts, the Court first discussed the his-
tory of the authority to regulate marriage, finding that the "regulation of
domestic relations" is "an area that has long been regarded as a virtually
exclusive province of the States."'265 "[A]t the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, [the states] possessed full power over the subject of marriage
and divorce [and] the Constitution delegated no authority to the Govern-
ment of the United States on the subject of marriage and divorce. 266 Al-
though the Court acknowledged that in certain instances the arm of the
federal government would reach into the marriage arena to regulate recogni-
tion for distinct federal purposes, such as immigration and federal life insur-
ance,267 DOMA had "a far greater reach; for it enacts a directive applicable
to over 1,000 federal statutes and the whole realm of federal regulations.
257 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682-83.
258 Id.
259 Id.
26 0 Id. at 2683.
261 Id.
262 ld.
263 Id. at 2684-88.
264 Id. at 2693-96.
265 Id. at 2691 (citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)).
266 Id. (citations omitted).
267 Id. at 1290.
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And its operation is directed to a class of persons that the laws of New York,
and of 11 other States, have sought to protect.
' 68
After providing this lesson in federalism, however, the Court inquired
into whether the resulting injury and indignity to same-sex couples "is a
deprivation of an essential part of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amend-
ment,"269 which guarantees that no person "be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law[J" 270 The Court then went back to the
fundamental and sacred nature of the intimate adult relationship, citing Law-
rence.271 Thus, although this aspect of the Court's opinion started off as an
exercise in federalism principles, it ended up validating New York's ex-
panded recognition of the value of intimate same-sex relationships as being
constitutionally protected.
The Court's second justification is that DOMA's definition of marriage
and its different treatment of similarly situated married persons under New
York law "violates basic due process and equal protection principles appli-
cable to the Federal Government.2 72 This is because disparate treatment re-
quires some other basis, which "'must at the very least mean that a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot' justify
disparate treatment of that group.2 73 The Court did not need to look further
than DOMA's legislative history to find this "desire to harm." Indeed, the
court found that the discriminatory intent was the "essence" of DOMA.
2 74
Because the principle effect of DOMA was to "identify a subset of state-
sanctioned marriages and make them unequal.... [t]he principal purpose is
to impose inequality, not for other reasons like governmental efficiency.
2 75
As such, DOMA's differentiation "demeans the couple, whose moral and
sexual choices the Constitution protects.2 176 The Court then struck down
DOMA's definition of "marriage" as an unconstitutional deprivation of lib-
erty protected by the Fifth Amendment, as made "more specific and all the
better understood and preserved" by the Equal Protection guarantee of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
277
268 Id. (citations omitted).
26 9 Id. at 2681.
270 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
271 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692-93 ("The States' interest in defining and regulating the
marital relation, subject to constitutional guarantees, stems from the understanding that mar-
riage is more than a routine classification for purposes of certain statutory benefits. Private,
consensual sexual intimacy between two adult persons of the same sex may not be punished by
the State, and it can form 'but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.' Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).... This status is a far-reaching legal acknowledgement of
the intimate relationship between two people, a relationship deemed by the State worthy of
dignity in the community equal with all other marriages. It reflects both the community's con-
sidered perspective on the historical roots of the institution of marriage and its evolving under-
standing of the meaning of equality.").
272 Id. at 2693 (citing U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)).
273 Id. (citing Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973)).274 
Id. at 2681.
275 Id. at 2694.
276 Id. (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
277 Id. at 2695.
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B. Legal Aftermath of Windsor
Although the Court restricted its holding to those same-sex marriages
lawfully recognized by states at the time, the broad language that the Court
used to expand the liberty interest at stake opened the door to expanded
application to same-sex couples, even in states that did not recognize
them.2 78 Indeed, Justice Scalia's dissent points out the ease with which the
majority opinion can be altered to apply, not only to the federal government,
but also to the states themselves.27 9 One of Justice Scalia's fears, among
others, with the Court's opinion is that it is too broad in its expanded concep-
tion of liberty and the fundamental right to marriage and family,280 a recur-
ring critique of opinions written by Justice Kennedy.2 1 By replacing certain
words in the Court's majority opinion, Justice Scalia points out the ease with
which the holding in Windsor could be made applicable to all states that
choose to discriminate against same-sex couples wishing to marry. To his
likely dismay, he was correct. It is almost shocking the rapidity with which
state and federal courts struck down state restrictions against same-sex mar-
riage following the 2013 Windsor opinion. The Court's decision in
Obergefell now compels that result in all 50 states and the District of
Columbia.
282
C. Scholarly Reactions to Windsor
The groundbreaking decision in Windsor also resulted in an avalanche
of scholarly reaction and criticism, 283 some hailing the decision as the final
piece in the "Kennedy Triumvirate" of Romer v. Evans,28 4 Lawrence, and
Windsor,285 which effectively eradicates the legitimization of discrimination
against homosexuals after Romer. The decision, while a grand leap forward
with respect to same-sex marriage rights, does not do enough to change the
structural and systematic nature of marriage. Some scholars argue that the
administrative burdens resulting from the legalizing same-sex marriages are
slight: changing terms in legislation to be gender neutral, or to replace "hus-
278 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. - (2015).
279 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2709-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
280 Id.
281 See Lamparello, supra note 143, at 27.
282 Obergefell, 576 U.S. at -.
283 See, e.g., Lamparello, supra note 143; Berger, supra note 180; Araiza, supra note 17;
William Baude, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage after Windsor, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 150 (2013); Anna Stolley Persky, The State of Same-Sex Marriage after Windsor, 28
WASH. LAW. 25 (2014); Scott Titshaw, Revisiting the Meaning of Marriage: Immigration for
Same-Sex Spouses in a Post-Windsor World, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 167 (2013); John R.
Dorocak, Is the Constitution Only Libertarian and Not Socially Conservative-U.S. v. Wind-
sor and the Unconstitutionality of DOMA's Definition of Marriage to Exclude Same-Sex
Couples-Requiem for a Heavyweight, 24 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 263 (2014); Mark
Strasser, What's Next after Windsor, 6 ELON L. REV. 387 (2014).
284 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
285 See Nathan Goetting, Gay Marriage Is a Fundamental Right, 70 NAT'L LAW. GUILD
REV. 137, 138 (2013).
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band" or "wife" with the term "spouse."2 6 In that regard, Windsor does not
represent the sort of wholesale shift in how intimate adult relationships are
recognized under the law. This subsection takes some of the reactionary
scholarship and judicial decisions after Windsor and uses those critiques to
determine how a court might decide the polygamy issue.
One of the more implicit critiques of Windsor is its effect on non-mari-
tal families, which could include "religious cohabitation" like the Brown
family. One scholar has recently critiqued Windsor as being a loss from the
perspective of recognition of non-marital families.287 The critiques rest on
Windsor's effect on gay and lesbian couples, and their families, living in any
of the other states that have not chosen to "dignify" their relationships.288 In
light of larger trends in cohabitation among all types of couples, fears exist
that the stance taken in Windsor favoring marriage could lead to Equal Pro-
tection claims of non-marital couples. Such an argument could again be used
to protect religious polygamists in any efforts for legal recognition of their
families.
Another critique of Windsor, albeit of recent Equal Protection and sub-
stantive Due Process cases coming out of the Supreme Court more gener-
ally, is that the Court did not expressly define whether or not sexual
orientation is a suspect class or whether sexual intimacy after Lawrence is a
fundamental right.8 9 The Court has not done a suspect class analysis for
purposes of Equal Protection since the Civil Rights Era, and many argue that
they are unlikely to classify any new suspect classes or to even do such an
analysis.29 ° The Court, in fact, explicitly refused to do a suspect class analy-
sis with respect to sexual orientation in Bowers, despite Bowers being over-
ruled by Lawrence and Windsor.91 Recent courts have implied this scrutiny
level from Windsor in crafting their own opinions. Others argue that same-
sex marriage advocates need a judicial decree that sexual orientation is such
a suspect class and a Supreme Court decision that implies "intimate plural-
ism" is the only view of human sexuality that passes constitutional muster.
92
"Intimate pluralism" would not only validate alternative marital structures,
but informal cohabitation relationships as well, as being on equal par with
traditional monogamous marriage.
286 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 23, at 1989.
287 See generally Erez Aloni, Deprivative Recognition, 61 UCLA L. RaV. 1279 (2014).
288 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
211 See Lamparello, supra note 143, at 30; Araiza, supra note 17, at 391.
290 Araiza, supra note 17, at 385; Lamparello, supra note 143, at 30.
291 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
292 Courts striking down definitions of marriage and re-writing them to pass constitutional
muster, some argue, results in state and federal courts "overstepping their 'properly limited
rolefs] in the constitutional structure."' Myers, supra note 41, at 1457 (quoting Cass R. Sun-
stein, Liberty After Lawrence, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1059, 1075-76 (2004)). See also Kevin J.
Worthen, Who Decides and What Difference Does It Make?: Defining Marriage in "Our Dem-
ocratic, Federal Republic," 18 BYU J. PuB. L. 273, 302-05 (2004) (arguing that a state statute
or state constitutional amendment, instead of a state judicial decision or federal statute, amend-
ment, or judicial decision, is the correct arena to define marriage).
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Many argue, however, that the Court is unlikely to make a suspect class
analysis or to analyze restrictions against unpopular groups using any sort of
scrutiny standard at all. Although some courts following Windsor have used
Windsor's implications to use strict scrutiny when analyzing their own state
statutes, others argue that this approach is improper, considering how the
Court in Windsor used "bare congressional" animus to ground its overturn-
ing DOMA. Professor Bill Araiza recently argued, among many others,
293
that Windsor marks the end of the tiers in the Supreme Court, relying instead
on "the Court's holistic, if ad hoc and particularized, estimations of the ra-
tionality and public-purpose basis for a challenged law."294 The "animus"
approach, he argues, "reflects the Court's attempt to read the social meaning
of legislation, and to test that meaning against Equal Protection's core re-
quirement that government act only in pursuit of a public purpose."2 95 Al-
though many argue that sexual orientation should be considered a suspect
class, the Court is unlikely to make such a finding as this type of process is
"deteriorating." In the face of such a deterioration, the focus on the right
under substantive Due Process becomes all the more important, as the Su-
preme Court recently proved in Obergefell v. Hodges, in which the Court
expounded upon the liberty interest at stake under substantive Due Process.
In Obergefell, the Court had an opportunity to either clarify its opinion in
Windsor with some return to Equal Protection's tiers analysis or further ex-
pand upon the substantive Due Process's liberty guarantee. The Court took
the latter route and crystalized the liberty interest at stake. While the Court
additionally found that denying marriages to same-sex couples296 violates
Equal Protection, it did so by focusing on the interconnectedness between
substantive Due Process and Equal Protection-it did not explicitly define
same-sex couples as a protected class, although the result is the same. The
holding in Obergefell thus does not exclude polygamists, and by focusing on
the importance of the right under substantive Due Process and comparing
their similar liberty interests, polygamists would then have to argue that their
liberty interests fit within the contours defined by Obergefell.
VI. "INTIMATE PLURALISM" OR "RELIGIOUS POLYGAMY"
AFTER WINDSOR
Taking into account the previous predictions arguing that the case that
will result in irreversible systematic change in marriage will be the next case
after Windsor, it is important to consider the end-game and the scope of any
293 Araiza, supra note 17, at 367.
294 1d. at 371.
295 Id. The danger in taking the "animus" approach is that it leaves legislatures without
direction on how to shape reactionary enforcement legislation to eradicate the harm. Enforce-
ment legislation must be "congruent and proportional" to the violation being remedied. If a
group is defined as a suspect class or a quasi-suspect class, it is easier to show a pattern of state
constitutional violations justifying enforcement legislations.
296 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. - (2015).
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future allowable marital structures. This would include legalized alternative
marital structures, such as same-sex marriage, polygamy, group marriage,
sibling/friend relationships, to name a few, allowing potential family mem-
bers to choose from a list of available civil options vis-A-vis other adults
involved in the marriage. Polygamy challenges the traditional, two-person
model of marriage in a way that even same-sex marriage cannot. Its recogni-
tion could lead to the end of traditional marriage as the elevated marital
form, benefiting all divergent sexual and marital minority groups. The lan-
guage of Windsor and the implications of the holding on the rights of
"emerging" groups like modern-day polygamists and polyamorists can be
used to support an argument to recognize multi-party marriages. This section
addresses the liberty interests at stake for polygamists as compared to those
implicated in Windsor, recognizing the dual legal characterizations of polyg-
amy as representative of "intimate pluralism" or as confined to "religious
polygamy." This section also weighs the costs and benefits that characteriz-
ing the liberty interest as either secular or religious will have on the ultimate
goals of those who support intimate pluralism as the only force behind ex-
panded marital rights. Although this article ultimately pushes for the re-
moval of religious influences from the legal analysis in favor of the larger
goal of "intimate pluralism," it recognizes the practical benefits of a Free
Exercise claim.
A. Defining the Liberty Interest of Polygamists
Because of the tenuous nature of the tiers approach after Windsor, the
modified analysis in Windsor breaks down to a two-part approach to legisla-
tion. The first step is to determine the liberty interest at stake. The second is
to then inquire whether the state's restrictions are based on mere desire to
harm (animus) or another purpose like governmental efficiency. With re-
spect to same-sex relationships, the Windsor Court implies that marriage
regulation is necessary not only for statutory benefits-bereavement leave,
healthcare options, pension benefits, spousal support, marital property, and
custody, adoption, and visitation, to name a few-but also because marriage
has a sacred element that is worthy of protection. The language elevates the
status of an enduring personal bond, with consensual "deviant" sexual be-
havior being part of the liberty interest inherent in that human relationship.
The Court provides that marriage is a "status" worthy of "dignity" in the
"community,". "equal with all other marriages."2 97 This reflects, Justice
Kennedy states, the community's considered perspective on the historical
roots of marriage, and the evolving understanding of the meaning of equal-
ity.298 Thus, the "liberty" interest at stake for same-sex couples is "equal
dignity" in the law and society. But the issues at stake for polygamists are




more than just "equal dignity" and acceptance of their families. Individual
actors involved in the marriages have a strong interest in legal recognition.
Using -this same approach for polygamists, is the liberty interest the
same? It is at this point in the analysis where defining the liberty interest
drastically determines the course of the remaining affected law. If the liberty
interest is defined as equal dignity of all alternative marital structures, in-
cluding polygamy as the primary example (the "intimate pluralism" school),
then this keeps the analysis within the confines of the fundamental right to
marriage, and Equal Protection/substantive Due Process Fourteenth Amend-
ment scholarship. In the style of Justice Scalia's dissent, the same arguments
could be used to expand the Court's conception of liberty in the marriage
arena to polygamous and all multi-party marriages. The effect of failing to
legally recognize polygamy is to take a class of persons and make them
unequal, depriving them of both the legal rights and obligations of their mar-
riages. The restrictions signal to the world that multi-party marriages are not
worthy of recognition in the community, equal with other types of relation-
ships that are granted the status of marriage. The children of polygamous
marriages suffer the ill effects of discrimination which Justice Kennedy in-
voked. Not only are they told their parents are criminals, but also that their
parents' marital choice means they must close themselves off to the rest of
society. The analogy to the "equal dignity" liberty interest in Windsor is
parallel for polygamists and polyamorists.
If the liberty interest is, instead, confined to "religious polygamy," as it
was defined for the family in the Brown case, then this kicks in an entirely
different area of the law-namely free exercise of religion-and a direct
comparison to the liberty interest at stake in Windsor becomes tenuous.
However, the legal arguments become stronger under the "hybrid rights"
theory. In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court took up the case of Wisconsin v.
Yoder, which some argue represents the outermost limits of the expansion of
Free Exercise cases after Reynolds.299 In Yoder, the Court exempted an
Amish family from a Wisconsin statute mandating attendance at school until
the age of sixteen. One tenet of the Amish faith is restricting interaction with
the secular, outside world. The state argued that it could enforce its educa-
tional requirements under the rationale in Reynolds, that a state can regulate
conduct. But instead of jumping on the question of whether or not limiting
education after the eighth grade level is subversive of good order, the Court
established a new paradigm for determining what conduct is protected by the
First Amendment. The Court held that the Amish family was exempted from
the state mandate not only because of the existence of a genuine religious
belief, but also because of the fundamental right of parents to educate their
children according to their own parameters.00
299 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see generally John Witte, Jr., Overview:
Religious Liberty in America, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, available at http://perma.cc/3YT3-
R4ZV.
300 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205.
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Although much of the opinion has been criticized as overly glorifying
the beautiful Amish way of life,30 1 as the dissent by Justice Douglas is quick
to point out as a sharp departure from the contours of the guidelines set out
in Reynolds,02 what emerges from this opinion is that courts will find that
religious conduct is exempted from generally applicable regulation if it im-
plicates not only religious conviction but also some other constitutionally
protected fundamental right, such as freedom of speech or the press or free-
dom of association.303 Justice Scalia later referred to this type of analysis as
"hybrid rights."3t1 4 Thus, religious conviction plus some other constitution-
ally protected fundamental right exempts a religious practice from a gener-
ally applicable law. However, just because the religious liberty interest
provides a historical liberty interest and elevates the activity into a more
defined protected sphere, does not mean that the equal dignity "intimate
pluralism" aim alone will not suffice. Indeed, this equal dignity of same-sex
marriage sufficed in Windsor as a status worthy of protection, and the import
of religious gloss causes more problems than its elevated status can justify.
B. Polygamy Restrictions Are Less Likely Based on Animus than
Restrictions on Same-Sex Marriage
Finding that the liberty interests at stake for polygamists, whether they
be secular or religious, are worthy of protection, the Windsor Court analysis
requires, at the least, a "reasonable" analysis of the discriminatory statute.
After determining the liberty interest, the next thing the Court did was inves-
tigate the legislation's intent. In the case of DOMA, the Court essentially
found the definition of marriage to be "unreasonable" based on the "bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group," an insufficient
basis to restrict such an important liberty interest as marriage.3 05 In other
words, in an attempt to cling to some sort of traditional tiers analysis, the
Court found no basis-whether it be compelling, rational, or legitimate-for
the distinction because of the negative intent of DOMA. 3 6 Another part of
section 3 of DOMA's definition of marriage restricted marriage to one man
and one woman, thus also restricting marriage to a two-person model.307 A
review of the legislative history, while revealing animus toward same-sex
marriage, reveals no such explicit hostility toward polygamists. It appears
that the numerosity limitation of one and one was automatic, so engrained as
the "norm" that no debate surrounded its inclusion. No explicit animus is
apparent in the legislative histories explicitly prohibiting all forms of polyg-
amy, at least in the secular sense in recent years.
301 Id. at 247 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
302 Id.
303 See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
301 Id. at 882.
30 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2717.3
06 Id.
307 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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With respect to the Morrill Act and the subsequent federal anti-polyg-
amy statutes, more explicit animus is apparent with respect to religious
polygamists. The Edwards-Tucker Act, enacted to supplement the Morrill
Act, specifically targeted Mormon polygamists, disenfranchising the corpo-
rate charter of the Church30 and escheating any property worth over $50,000
to the federal government.09 Those Acts, however, have been largely over-
ruled to remove any direct cause of action against the Mormon Church or its
members. Today, almost all anti-bigamy and anti-polygamy state restrictions
have been enacted without any clear animus or hostility directly toward re-
ligious groups. It is questionable then whether polygamists could use Wind-
sor's "direct evidence of animus" test to find that anti-polygamy statutes are
unreasonable.
The only state where direct evidence of animus could be found in the
language of the legislation could be with the Utah Constitution's "irrevoca-
ble ban" on polygamy, as its language is more directly aimed at religious
polygamists. The state constitutional provision begins by stating that free-
dom of religion is guaranteed in Utah, but that polygamy is forever prohib-
ited. The direct tie between religion and polygamy is apparent, and the
legislative and political history with respect to the 1890 constitutional provi-
sion only illuminates this curt animus. With respect to other modem state
restrictions on polygamy, even the current Utah civil statute against polyg-
amy, the religious discrimination and political motivations are not apparent.
From a legal standpoint, adding the religious protection elevates the
practice into the realm of "strict scrutiny" under First Amendment analysis,
which is an incarnation of the Fourteenth Amendment application of a tiers
approach that the Court still uses today in religion cases. Under this test, as
in the Lukumi animal sacrifice case, the statute cannot target religious prac-
tices or show direct animus.310 If the law, however, is generally applicable
and does not directly target a religious group or practice, as most polygamy
restrictions are today, then the restriction is considered to be constitutional.
Most restrictions today fall under this "neutral and general" category and
thus escape Free Exercise challenge. However, the First Amendment allows
the use of strict scrutiny if the government animus in enforcement is appar-
ent. With respect to religious polygamists, as shown in the Brown case, po-
lice specifically target religious cohabitants over all other forms of multiple
simultaneous adult relationships.3" ' Under strict scrutiny for restricting "re-
ligious cohabitation" then, the government had to show a "compelling"
state interest.
Also recognizing, however, that religious polygamists present both a
fundamental right to marriage issue and a religious exercise issue, a court
could employ, as did the court in Brown, the "hybrid rights" theory estab-
308 Edmunds-Tucker Act, § 17, 24 Stat. 635, 638 (1887) (repealed 1978).
3
-9Id. §§ 13, 16, 17, 24 Stat. at 637-38.
310 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
311 Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1210 (D. Utah 2013).
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lished in Wisconsin v. Yoder.3 12 By recognizing dual fundamental rights, this
duality pushes the activity into the protected arena, further requiring strict
scrutiny for governmental restrictions. Coupling the right to engage in relig-
ious practices as part of the liberty interests of polygamists to the equal dig-
nity of their relationships subjects restrictions on legal access to polygamy to
strict scrutiny. Although the hybrid rights approach set out in Yoder has been
criticized by scholars as an aberration in First Amendment jurisprudence,313
the analysis remains and could be used by religious polygamists to bolster
their support for heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment. This ap-
proach would also recognize the value of religion as a deeply rooted aspect
of an individual's culture, contributing more to the goals of acceptance of
religious culture in the United States. Protecting the rights of religious
polygamists grants marginalized religious groups the same legal status as
those belonging and subscribing to the majority, Judeo-Christian religions,
valuing the cultural diversity that their religious practices import.
C. Government Interest or Efficiency
But animus alone, even under Windsor, is not the end of the inquiry.
The Court does indicate that it is searching for some other legitimate or
rational state function in limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples. The
Court points out that the intent of DOMA was to "identify a subset of state-
sanctioned marriages and make them unequal, ... [t]he principal purpose is
to impose inequality, not for other reasons like governmental efficiency." 
3 14
This reference to governmental efficiency suggests that such a justification
could be sufficient for disparate treatment, which further suggests "rational
basis" review, as "administrative burden" is usually an insufficient compel-
ling reason to restrict a fundamental right or to impose unequal treatment.
Such a stance fits in line with interpretations after Lawrence that sexual ori-
entation is not a protected class. This also suggests that state courts follow-
ing Windsor that implied such heightened scrutiny may have overshot the
standard in an attempt to follow in Windsor's ultimate holding. Regardless,
the Court had already pointed out that with respect to same-sex marriages,
the administrative burden would be so minute as to not warrant serious merit
as a defense to disparate treatment.
The "governmental efficiency" justification for polygamists, however,
is much more problematic. If religious protection were included, however,
312 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
313 See Emp't Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 896 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The
Court endeavors to escape from our decisions in Cantwell and Yoderby labeling them 'hybrid'
decisions .... but there is no denying that both cases expressly relied on the Free Exercise
Clause .... ); id. at 908 (Blackmum, J., dissenting) ("[The majority] mischaracterize[s] this
Court's precedents. The Court discards leading free-exercise cases such as [Cantell and Wis-
consin] as 'hybrid."), see also Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the
Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109, 1121 (1990) ("One suspects that the notion of
'hybrid' claims was created for the sole purpose of distinguishing Yoder in this case.").
"' Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694 (emphasis added).
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then governmental efficiency would not be an issue. At that point the gov-
ernment would be correcting and accommodating its restriction on a funda-
mental right, and "governmental efficiency" cannot defeat strict scrutiny."5
If secular polygamists are not a protected class under Equal Protection or
substantive Due Process, as they are unlikely to be explicitly labeled as such
in any future Supreme Court cases on the issue considering their current
move away from such an analysis, then "governmental efficiency" may hin-
der legal recognition of polygamy and multi-party marriages. With respect to
"religious polygamy," if viewed as a protected class under First Amendment
case law, it cannot be defeated by something like "governmental effi-
ciency." The purpose must be compelling. Legal recognition of polygamy,
unlike same-sex marriage, will require a wholesale shift in marriage statutes,
on both the federal and state court levels. If even one state, say Utah, were to
legally recognize polygamous marriages, the Windsor effect would also re-
quire the federal government to take those state-sanctioned marriages and
make them equal under the roughly 1,000 federal statutes affecting mar-
riage.316 Much legislative and administrative effort would have to be ex-
pended in order to properly set up a scheme that regulates the contours of
polygamous marriage, at least with respect to the entrance and exit rules.
Even eliminating the philosophical and political reasons that courts and leg-
islatures cling to monogamy, the administrative burden is apparent in legal-
izing not only polygamy but any other type of alternative marital structure
that challenges the two-person marital arrangement and the status-based im-
plications of such a label.
Despite the administrative burden, such an objection should not prevent
legislatures, nor have they prevented lawmakers in other countries that do
recognize polygamy, from crafting a scheme to turn "intimacy pluralism"
into marriage. Even today, statutes are set up to accommodate serial polyg-
amy, or serial monogamy, granting more than one ex-spouse federal pension
benefits, for example, if married to the claimant for more than ten years.
Legal scholars have also begun to craft rules to accommodate more than one
simultaneous spouse. Recently, following in the heels of Professor Adrienne
Davis' argument to adopt business partnership default rules to inform polyg-
amy regulations,3"7 Professor Brunson published an article detailing how po-
lygamous marriage supports a larger policy to change federal tax laws to
individual filer, regardless of the marriage status of the parties. The author of
this article has proposed a regulatory scheme to regulate entrance and exit to
polygamous marriage which attempts to leave as much of the default con-
tours of those relationships up to the autonomous contractual will of the
parties, with some judicial and administrative oversight. Further, if a court
were to find, based on the historical treatment in discrimination against
315 See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 102 n.9 (1972) (holding that for
fundamental rights, "mere administrative convenience" is not a compelling interest).
316 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2679.
317 Davis, supra note 23, at 2002-24.
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polygamists, that they are a protected class, then this government burden of
re-writing the marriage laws cannot defeat a claim for Equal Protection and
substantive Due Process.
Second and third wives also need both legal protection and societal
acceptance that their marriages and commitments to their husband are just as
valid and valuable as a first wife. While some argue that informal cohabi-
tants may have an Equal Protection claim after Windsor, so too would the
"religious cohabitants" who have no formal recognition or protection. Sub-
sequent polygamous wives are routinely discriminated against. Immigration
laws only allow one "wife" to enter the country under a spousal visa. Courts
will not grant such informal polygamous wives "divorces," leaving them
with no property rights or spousal support or any of the multitude of rights
that should recognize their value and contributions to the marriage. If fami-
lies wish to structure their polygamous marriage differently than those equal
default rules, such should be acceptable with some limitations, but in all
instances the law should strive to recognize the rights of subsequent wives.
While governmental efficiency initially seems to be a legitimate concern
mitigating against extending the contours of marriage, the more important
concern of protecting "equal dignity" should prevail.
Even without the addition of religious protection, Windsor can be used
to support an argument to recognize polygamy. The secular liberty interests
are analogous (equal dignity of consensual adults). While the animus in the
legislation is not as explicit against secular polygamists as against same-sex
couples or religious polygamists, the enforcement does evidence animus.
Not only would this approach validate and protect families and their mem-
bers in their alternative marital choice, but it could also lead to a wholesale
shift in marital regulation and the approach to intimate adult relationships
that cannot emerge while the United States clings to its two-person monoga-
mous marital ideal.
D. What About Religion? A Counterproductive Framing
Couching polygamy with other alternative marriage structures ignores a
lingering and undeniably defining feature of the practice: religion. As indi-
cated previously, most practicing polygamists in the world, the United States
included, find their authority from religion."' In both the fundamentalist
Mormon and the orthodox Islamic traditions, men are allowed (and with
fundamentalist Mormonism's teachings encouraged) to take multiple wives
as a part of their religious practices. For many polygamists, their religious
beliefs are the most important feature of their lives. Entire communities
center around shared religious beliefs in both the fundamentalist Mormon
3I Alexandre, supra note 59, at 1463; Wing, supra note 62, at 837; Black, supra note 59,
at 500 ("[Polygamy's] defenders frequently cite religious convictions for such a practice.");
Davis, supra note 23, at 1969. But see Wing, supra note 62, at 838 ("In many African coun-
tries... the practice is based on nationality or ethnicity, and not religion."); BAILEY & KAUF-
MAN, supra note 26, at 8 (listing sociocultural justifications for polygamy).
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and orthodox Islamic traditions.3 19 Ignoring the religious nature of the prac-
tice in the legal analysis could also devalue liberty interests of those who
practice for not just social or cultural reasons. Adding religious influences
and a Free Exercise claim into the legal analysis would give polygamists
more weapons in the legal assault on anti-polygamy laws, as it provides the
strongest avenue for constitutional protection under the "hybrid rights" the-
ory, but what does such an approach cost? This section will discuss how
adding a free exercise of religion claim to the Equal Protection and substan-
tive Due Process approach of Windsor benefits the analysis for polygamists,
but then balances those gains against he cost to the lasting effects of such a
holding. It is quite possible that religious polygamy may come before secu-
lar "intimate pluralism" as the next step in that direction.
From a legal standpoint, it has been discussed previously that religious
protection adds a more grounded liberty interest and a higher level of scru-
tiny, immune from "governmental efficiency" justifications. But other bene-
fits arise from including a Free Exercise claim. Although it may seem
counterintuitive, considering the country's continued general distaste for po-
lygamy, another policy reason to add religion to the claim is that Americans
are most familiar with, and are more apt to accept, polygamy practiced as a
result of religious impetus over secular polygamists or polyamorists who
may still be considered by the monogamous majority as merely sexually
deviant. The recent increased exposure to polygamy focuses mostly on relig-
ious polygamists. The Brown family, as well as the fictitious HBO family
the Hendricksons, is motivated by religion.320 One of the main focuses of the
"Sister Wives" show is to not only shed light on the polygamist lifestyle of
the cast, but also to share their religious beliefs behind it.32" ' As a country
heavily entrenched in religion, Christianity or otherwise, society may be
more accepting of alternative marriages performed according to religious
ceremonies and beliefs as a reflection of their own beliefs in the sacred and
spiritual nature of marriage.
Although employing a Free Exercise claim in addition to the Windsor
approach will definitely push the level of scrutiny higher and help to em-
brace religious diversity as a valuable and worthy outcome in line with
larger national goals of pluralism, adding a claim may come at great cost,
implicating other First Amendment and Equal Protection tenets.
Under general accommodation and Free Exercise cases, religious ex-
ceptions from generally applicable laws do not necessarily translate into pos-
itive law. Most religious accommodation/Free Exercise cases are individuals
attempting to opt out of a law because of their genuine religious convictions.
Opting out of the draft, for example, does not mean that the government
must then create a separate institution to regulate those draft dodgers. Or
smoking peyote as a part of one's spiritual enlightenment may exempt one
319 See Hagarty, Philly's Black Muslims, supra note 107.
320 Big Love (Home Box Office television broadcast 2007).
32' Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1178 (D. Utah 2013).
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from criminal laws, but it does not mean that the court would have to then
create a separate set of rules for Native American peyote smokers; they are
just left alone to smoke peyote without being prosecuted. With polygamous
marriage recognition, however, more than just exemptions from criminal law
are at stake. This article envisions positive legislation creating an alternative
type of marriage. If a court were to strike down civil polygamy restrictions,
thus prompting reactionary enforcement legislation that is "congruent and
proportional" to the violation, then the legislation would be limited in how it
crafts the polygamy scheme to permit those with sincere religious beliefs to
have access. Otherwise, the resulting legislation would not be proportional
to the rights sought to be protected.
Creating a separate scheme of marriage available only to those who
profess sincere religious belief will violate Establishment Clause principles.
Although many countries that do recognize polygamy limit it based on the
adherent's belonging to a certain religion, such a stance could import into the
U.S. system a scheme that favors religion over non-religion. It would elevate
those who engage in polygamy, polyamory, or multi-party marriages for re-
ligious reasons over those who would choose to engage in it for the multi-
tude of other social, cultural, and individual purposes at stake. Even
assuming that the law can create default rules for dyadic marriage and relig-
ious polygamous marriage that confer exactly equal legal rights, such a law
would grant religious polygamists legal recognition for an additional legiti-
mate sexual partner and potentially additional marital property that unrecog-
nized non-religious polygamists would not enjoy. This could lead then to
Equal Protection violations for non-religious polygamists who seek the ben-
efits of recognized polygamy.
Another concern arising out of that point is that restricting access to
religious adherents could lead to fraudulent claims of religious exercise in
order to gain access to the institution of polygamy. Studies show, however,
that most people do not adopt fundamentalist Mormonism or orthodox Islam
simply because of polygamy, discovering instead later on that their religions
allow them to take on additional wives. Indeed, people who engage in polyg-
amy today do so despite the criminal risks and social stigmas involved, ei-
ther because their conviction is so strong or their lifestyles so engrained that
criminal prosecution does not deter them. But the risk of fraudulent claims
of religion increases when the criminality and social stigma is removed. The
availability of polygamy to only religious adherents would require an extra
evidentiary showing of sincere religious belief, as such evidentiary showings
are currently employed in Free Exercise/accommodation cases. While fact
finders are likely savvy enough to determine whether or not a person's indi-
vidual religious beliefs are genuine, and indeed a regulatory scheme could
be set up to manage this issue, the potential greatly increases that fraudulent
religious beliefs will seep into the analysis, thus diminishing the integrity of
the purposes of the free exercise of religion mandate.
Further, the court in the Brown case pointed out that the narrowest
grounds upon which to strike down the cohabitation prong of Utah's criminal
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statute was based upon substantive Due Process. Even under "rational ba-
sis" review, as the Brown court employed, the cohabitation prong was struck
down. In that regard, we do not really need the religion claim to get us to the
ultimate goal of "intimacy pluralism," and those who practice polygamy as
a tenet of their religion would be subsumed under that larger goal anyway.
Including a Free Exercise analysis also makes religion the most protected
aspect of the activity, instead of the fundamental right to marriage and inti-
macy privacy aspects of the practice. Focusing on the latter could lead to
even more alternative marital arrangements having a claim for equal protec-
tion under the law.
The larger implications of including Free Exercise touch on that ulti-
mate goal of intimacy pluralism, and such a claim would only further inter-
twine religious influences that shape the contours of marriage. As similarly
argued by Destro with respect to same-sex marriage, legal recognition of
polygamy and alternative marital structures is a "strategic objective in a
more ambitious and longer-term philosophical and political effort to separate
from 'hetero-normativity' and 'heteropatriarchy' of cultures of Judeo-Chris-
tian and Muslim religions.32 2 Restricting polygamous marriage to only re-
ligious adherents brings more religious influences-albeit of a minority
religious belief-into the marriage regulation arena. This would also signal
to the individuals involved in the polygamous marriages that marriage rules
mandated by their religion as to the content of the marriage are also valid for
purposes of regulating rights and conduct within the marriage, instead of
empowering members to structure their polygamous marriages in a manner
more protective of their individual needs. Although religious polygamists
structure their behavior within their marriage according to their religious
teachings, the law should not encourage that influence, as almost all tradi-
tional religions and their rules on the rights of women and marriage are
almost always invoked to subvert those rights and hinder progress.
Further, excluding religion from the analysis undercuts the "slippery
slope" argument against polygamy first established in Reynolds that such
behaviors lead to legitimization of other dangerous religious practices such
as human sacrifice. By making polygamy a marriage issue and not a relig-
ious one, it closes the door to the use of an argument to recognize such
religious practices. Although the "slippery slope" argument against polyg-
amy in the marriage context remains, where polygamy recognition could
lead to the recognition of other non-traditional marital arrangements, this is
actually the direction where intimacy pluralists want polygamy to lead.
Philosophically, this Author supports the recognition of polygamy with-
out any religious constraints or showings as part of a larger push for recogni-
tion of all alternative marital structures and private contractualization of
marital rights and obligations. But considering the direction that the Brown
case took and the strength that free exercise of religion claims add to the
322 Robert A. Destro, "You Have the Right to Remain Silent": Does the U.S. Constitution
Require Public Affirmation of Same-Sex Marriage?, 27 BYU J. PUB. L. 397, 397 (2013).
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argument in support of polygamy, the next step in the process may realisti-
cally be that religion and religious freedom become the motivating factors in
any upcoming cases on polygamy. Even as such, a step in that direction
could still lend support for an argument to recognize all alternative marriage
forms.
VII. CONCLUSION: ERASING THE LEGACY OF REYNOLDS
ON MARRIAGE AND POLYGAMY
Taking such a holistic approach to polygamy and other alternative mari-
tal structures can eradicate those remaining legacies of Reynolds that limit a
court's analysis of proper civil marriage in the United States. Legal recogni-
tion will remove the continued criminality aspect of attempting to legally
obtain more than one marriage license, giving polygamists less of a reason to
hide from society for fear of police, but would also give them a positive
impetus to legally register their polygamous marriages. This gives the mem-
bers of the family, especially the second, third, and fourth wives, the ability
to be more open about their lifestyles and marriages in public, instead of
having to lie to those who may not be accepting. As a proponent of the
power of positive legislation, legal recognition can also lead to more societal
acceptance of polygamy, which is still shunned and disfavored by the major-
ity of society, despite its increased recent exposure through television shows
and media coverage.
This approach also gives all wives legal protections, including the con-
stellation of rights that the legislature will have to determine flows from
such a union. Rights to marital property, spousal support, insurance and pen-
sion benefits, and custody and visitation rights, to name a few, give such
subsequent spouses legal personality, filling up the hollow legal existence of
second, third, and fourth wives, even where the Brown decision falls short.
Valuing these subsequent wives under the law will also increase their bar-
gaining power and position in the marriage. It could curtail the practice of
some Mormon polygamists who have absurd numbers of wives, by requiring
consent of all the wives to add a new spouse, thus empowering each individ-
ual wife to protect her rights if her own religious convictions do not comport
with adding yet another spouse.
Further recognizing and legalizing polygamy can create a civil process
that attracts participation in the legal system, creating a "norm" among
polygamists. If the system is successful in that regard, then this legal norm
of registering and regulating polygamists will then become the cultural,
community norm within the insular communities. As previously argued for,
"If the participants are aware of their legal statuses and rights upon entering
a polygamous marriage, then this collective knowledge can establish a base-
line of acceptable behavior by establishing any unsavory, abusive, or crimi-
nal behavior as errant and never acceptable as a 'norm' within any
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polygamous community.3 23 The more familiar a religious community be-
comes with the legal marriage process, the easier it becomes to change the
cultural belief within these societies that the law and authority figures are to
fear. Legal recognition not only can change the culture within these commu-
nities, but it can also provide secular, civil oversight that is detached from
any particular idiosyncratic belief about polygamous marriage. Secular deci-
sion-makers can serve that necessary ferreting out function to protect against
underage applications or incestuous applications where a religious belief
might allow both.
This approach removes the racial and cultural biases in the law that
currently influence restrictions on marriage diversity in America. It does so
by refusing to let the Judeo-Christian morals of the majority dictate the con-
tours of marriage, an influence which has been used to justify "natural law"
restrictions on access to marriage in the past. Although polygamy is most
prominent among racial minorities and immigrant populations in the United
States today, the most visual polygamists are "white" Americans. Thus, in-
stead of linking polygamy with "other" races, legal recognition will reverse
the stigma that Mormons are "race traitors" in the larger attempt to make
marriage and polygamy "race-less." It thus gives society a larger, global
view of marriage, accepting a more expansive, multicultural approach to re-
ligious practices and marriage without favoring such religiously motivated
practices over non-religiously motivated one. This recognizes and values the
other social, cultural, and practical reasons why many polygamists choose
this alternative lifestyle. It values the diversity in marriage, which would
include the types that stretch back into human history-not just Western
history-embracing the multicultural aspects which marriage rituals have
come to define.
Legal recognition and regulation of polygamy also takes an institution
viewed as barbaric and unprogressive and makes it almost the exact oppo-
site: polygamy could be the most liberal of all available marriage structures.
It gives individuals more autonomous choice in the contours of their mar-
riage, more in line with liberty and privacy interests, and provides more
room for private ordering in one's intimate adult relationships. Even among
polygamists, each family differs in how they allocate resources and manage
their households. Some polygamist wives live in the same house with their
children, while others may live in completely different buildings or neigh-
borhoods, but they are left to their own determination as a family as to how
to manage their private lives. It also allows working wives to feel less
"guilty" about leaving the marital home to pursue personal interests as an-
other spouse is available to balance those other necessary duties.
323 Faucon, supra note 28, at 47. But see RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRU-
DENCE 213-14 (1990) (rejecting the notion that law affects behavior indirectly by altering
attitudes and through them behavior).
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It further takes some of the control away from the government in deter-
mining the contours of marriage, pushing the institution out of the hands of
politically motivated actors and into the private, individual sphere. Although
the state may fear that allowing such private ordering in marriage could
make every man a "government unto himself," with respect to privacy inti-
macy and personal adult relationships, each man and woman should be able
to consensually govern this most important aspect of their private lives. The
government should only intrude to protect against lack of consent, underage
marriage, and abuse, as it does now with respect to all marriages. Otherwise,
allowing polygamy gives parties more options than its prohibition.
This return to embracing individual determinations over the contours of
marriage, instead of the government, can start the removal of access to mar-
riage from the arsenal of political parties. Although historically access to
marriage has been used to suppress unpopular political groups and although
many fortuitously call polygamy the "next civil rights movement,"3 24 per-
mitting polygamy and making "intimacy pluralism" the ultimate goal of
marriage makes access to marriage a less effective means of suppressing
politically unpopular groups. Granted, the fight for legal recognition of po-
lygamy and other alternative forms of marriage would decidedly be a politi-
cal one-the ACLU has taken up the case of religious polygamists-but he
aftermath of its recognition would have a chilling effect against all those in
power who would seek to use marriage as a political tool.
Polygamy in the legal scholarship and, indeed, in the jurisprudence is
nothing new. Many have argued that polygamy should not only be
decriminalized, but also legally recognized since the Reynolds decision was
handed down in 1878. The exercise, however, appeared merely academic, as
the potential for actual recognition of polygamy in the legal and social clime
of the United States seemed so far-fetched and incredulous to warrant seri-
ous consideration. But since the Brown case and the positivity from legal
scholars that the decision has invoked for a move toward social and legal
acceptance, higher courts and legislatures may very well have to square the
issue of polygamy with modern conceptions of marriage and liberty sooner
than anticipated. The law will soon have to make a choice among simply
decriminalizing polygamy, recognizing it for religious polygamists only, or
allowing polygamy as an alternative marital structure. Courts may very well
seize upon the freedom of religion jurisprudence to ultimately strike down
restrictions on polygamy, and in that case, even positive benefits about di-
versity of religion can result. These are not insignificant goals, nor should
the religious aspect of polygamy fail to inform the judiciary's and legisla-
ture's analysis of the issue.
324 Hall, supra note 5.
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